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Synthesis
Archetypal games generate diverse models of power, conflict, and cooperation
Bryan Bruns 1 and Christian Kimmich 2,3
ABSTRACT. Interdependence takes many forms. We show how three patterns of power generate diverse models for understanding
dynamics and transformations in social-ecological systems. Archetypal games trace pathways that go beyond a focus on a few social
dilemmas to recognize and understand diversity and complexity in a landscape of social situations, including families of coordination and
defection problems. We apply the extended topology of two-person two-choice (2 × 2) games to derive simple archetypes of interdependence
that generate models with overlapping opportunities and challenges for collective action. Simplifying payoff matrices by equalizing outcome
ranks (making ties to show indifference among outcomes) yields three archetypal games that are ordinally equivalent to payoff structures
for independence, coordination, and exchange, as identified by interdependence theory in social psychology. These three symmetric patterns
of power combine to make an asymmetric archetype for zero-sum conflict and further structures of power and dependence. Differentiating
the ranking of outcomes (breaking ties) transforms these primal archetypes into more complex configurations, including intermediate
archetypes for synergy, compromise, convention, rivalry, and advantage. Archetypal models of interdependence, and the pathways through
which they generate diverse situations, could help to understand institutional diversity and potential transformations in social-ecological
systems, to distinguish between convergent and divergent collective action problems for organizations, and to clarify elementary patterns
of power in governance.
Key Words: asymmetric social situations; coordination games; ecology of games; equilibrium selection; interdependence theory; social
dilemmas; system dynamics archetypes
INTRODUCTION
“My mask protects you, your mask protects me,” expresses
interdependence in trying to control the spread of COVID-19. Each
person has power to determine the other’s outcome but has no
control over their own fate. The Buddhist Avatamsaka Sutra
describes two people chained in place, each with a spoon too long
to feed themself, but each able to feed the other (Aruka 2001). In
their Atlas of Interpersonal Situations, Kelley et al. (2003) use the
phrase “I’ll scratch your back if  you scratch mine” to summarize
this kind of reciprocity in an elementary exchange situation.  
To practice “social distancing” during a pandemic and reduce the
risk of infection when approaching each other in a hallway or along
a sidewalk, each of us could move to the left or right. Either
direction would be effective, but we are both better off  coordinating
on the choice, as with driving a vehicle on the left or right. This
coordination creates a stable equilibrium outcome in which each
person’s action is the best response to what the other does. Lewis
(2002) argues that conventions that are used to solve coordination
problems are central to social life, including language, culture, and
norms. As with the saying about fish not noticing the water, we live
within a sea of conventions, usually taken for granted, that enable
us to communicate, compete, and cooperate. Norms and their
emergence, maintenance, and disappearance play a crucial role in
social life (Bicchieri 2005, Legros and Cislaghi 2020), including the
governance of natural resources in social-ecological systems
(Ostrom 2000, 2005).  
I might wear a mask seeking only to protect myself. A mask with
an unfiltered exhaust might protect me but not others (Pejó and
Biczók 2020). In this case, our actions for self-protection would be
independent. “We go our separate ways” (Kelley et al. 2003),
regardless of what the other person may do. Each person has a
dominant strategy, a strategy that is better whatever the other
person does, which, in this (hypothetical) case, still allows each
person to get their best outcome.  
These three symmetric situations illustrate archetypal games, which
are elementary models for interdependence in social-ecological
situations. Archetypal patterns can help us to recognize and analyze
interactions and dynamics in social-ecological systems (Cullum et
al. 2017, Eisenack et al. 2019, Oberlack et al. 2019, Sietz et al. 2019).
Social dilemmas such as the “Prisoner’s Dilemma” are not the only
forms of interdependence that matter in environmental governance
(McAdams 2009, Kimmich 2013, Bisaro and Hinkel 2016). There
is a need to better our understanding of the diversity of
interdependence in strategic situations and the different challenges
to cooperation (Curry et al. 2020). Rules with enforcement by
punitive sanctions may help to solve some dilemmas but may be
counterproductive in coordination problems. Different situations
may require different solutions such as common knowledge, trust
building, shared expectations, norms, compromise, reciprocity, or
changing rules to improve outcomes.  
We apply the extended topology of 2 × 2 games (Robinson and
Goforth 2005, Heilig 2011, Hopkins 2014, Bruns 2015; Robinson
et al., unpublished manuscript https://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/
download?doi=10.1.1.619.4992&rep=rep1&type=pdf) to develop
a set of archetypes for interdependence. These archetypes go
beyond a few famous games to trace systematic relationships
between elementary models of strategic interaction. Rather than a
jumble of stories or a scattering of payoff matrices, archetypal
games offer landmarks and pathways for navigating a landscape of
cooperation and conflict. Archetypal games can aid in
understanding the diversity of situations, their dynamics, and their
potential transformations. We use a deductive approach to identify
the simplest archetypes. We select additional intermediate
archetypes based on their relevance for modeling collective action.
We find convergence with empirically relevant situations identified
in interdependence theory in social psychology (Kelley et al. 2003)
and show an efficient way to map relationships between archetypes.
These archetypes for interdependence can help to understand a
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Fig. 1. Payoff matrices for simple 2 × 2 situations. (A) “My mask protects you, your mask protects me.” (B) Primal Exchange: payoff
matrix for wearing a mask that only protects others, ranking of outcomes for row and column actors if  only one’s own outcomes
matter. (C) Basic archetypes with one preference each and ties (indifference) for the three lowest ranked outcomes. Payoffs from two
symmetric games combine to form a pair of asymmetric threat games. (D) Breaking ties. Ranking one outcome lower (3,3) than the
other (4,4) transforms Primal Coordination into Convention. In reverse, equalizing payoffs (making ties) simplifies Convention into
Primal Coordination.
diverse range of situations, including harmony, coordination,
exchange, advantage, power, dependence, and conflict.
METHODS
The smiling and frowning faces in Fig. 1A show the relative
ranking of different outcomes for wearing a mask that only
protects the other person. Numbers from 1 to 4 can indicate the
ranks in the normal form payoff matrices used in game theory
(Fig. 1B). In this hypothetical case, each person only cares whether
the other wears a mask. Either both outcomes are best (4) if  the
other person wears a mask, or both are worst (1) if  the other
person does not wear a mask.  
Key aspects of the methods can be explained using even simpler
preference structures in which each actor prefers a single outcome.
Simplification of 2 × 2 games into matrices with ties for the three
lowest-ranked outcomes identifies basic archetypes (Fig. 1C and
Table 1; Appendix 1). Each actor prefers a single outcome (shown
as 4) and is indifferent among the other three outcomes. If  the
best outcomes are in the same cell, there is agreement on the same
win-win outcome. Diagonally opposed preferences create discord,
which, in repeated interaction, might be resolved by taking turns.
In symmetric games such as “Win-win” and “Discord,” both
actors face the same set of possible outcomes and payoffs. If  they
switched positions as column and row player, the choices would
look the same. Payoffs from symmetric games combine to form
asymmetric games. Thus, payoffs from Win-win and Discord
combine to form games in which the best outcomes for each actor
are either in the same row or in the same column. In this situation,
if  there is communication or repeated interaction, then one actor
has the power to threaten to deny a good outcome for the other
unless there is an acceptable agreement such as taking turns to
Table 1. Basic archetypes. In these archetypes, there is one







“One best way;” best outcomes for both





“We disagree;” opposed interests; best
outcomes in diagonally opposite cells; for
repeated interaction, reciprocity by taking





“Take turns, or else;” Row Threat or
Column Threat; best outcomes in same row
or column; asymmetry favors one actor,
but the other can threaten to block unless






†Game identifiers from Bruns (2015).
get the best outcome. This potential threat resembles the “Strict
Threat” game with four ranked outcomes (Guyer and Rapoport
1970). Switching position as “Row” or “Column” player forms
pairs of asymmetric games. One of the two games can be treated
as a representative asymmetric archetype, in this case, a “Row
Threat” game, to the right (southeast) of the diagonal formed by
the two symmetric games.  
Asymmetric games can be located and identified using names and
abbreviations for the symmetric game payoffs that combine to
create their payoff structure (Fig. 1C; Bruns 2015). Interchanging
columns or rows (or both) is assumed to represent the same
strategic situation, i.e., a variant of the same game (Rapoport et
al. 1976). Thus, for example, any game with the two highest ranked
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Fig. 2. Primal archetypes. Payoff patterns from three symmetric primal archetypes for exchange, coordination, and independence
combine to form asymmetric archetypes. Each row has the same payoffs for the row actor and each column has the same payoffs for
the column actor. Changes in the ranking of outcomes link neighboring games, i.e., swapping a “1” and a “4.” Matrices for variants
that are equivalent by interchanging rows, columns, or positions are omitted or payoffs are shaded in gray and are discussed further
in Appendix 1.
outcomes together in the same cell and indifference among the
lower ranked outcomes would still be a variant of Win-win. Here,
we use a simplified version of Robinson and Goforth’s (2005)
Cartesian-style convention, putting Row’s highest payoff in the
right-hand column and Column’s highest payoff in the upper row
(Row’s 4 right, Column’s 4 up). A convention for consistently
displaying payoff matrices makes it easier to compare games. It
is particularly helpful for the many asymmetric games that do not
have an obvious “cooperative” outcome.  
In coordination situations, a social convention or norm helps to
select one of the possible equilibria as the preferred solution, for
example, driving on the right. In the simplest coordination game,
the two alternatives are equally ranked (Fig. 1D). In a second
situation, one alternative is preferred and one is ranked lower (Fig.
1D). For games with three ranks, the number 3 is used to show
the second-best outcome for simplicity in displaying payoff
matrices and for consistency with strict games with four ranks.
“Primal Coordination” models an initially arbitrary choice
between a convention to keep to the left or to keep to the right.
Once agreed, the convention is preferred, and the other outcome
is ranked lower. This procedure breaks the ties in payoffs and
changes the game. The reverse operation of making ties to show
indifference among outcomes simplifies “Convention” into
Primal Coordination. The operations of making and breaking
ties extend to other archetypal games (see Results and Appendix
1).  
Here, we analyze and identify archetypes in game theory payoff
matrices using the operations of making ties, breaking ties, and
combining payoff patterns. Symmetric payoff patterns combine
to make asymmetric games, including asymmetric archetypes.
Transforming payoff matrices by equalizing outcome ranks
(making ties to show indifference) yields simpler archetypes.
Differentiating payoff rankings (breaking ties) transforms
simpler archetypes into more complex configurations.
RESULTS
We first show how the three symmetric primal archetypes combine
payoff patterns to make asymmetric primal archetypes. We then
show how breaking ties in primal archetypes generates families
of games linked by making and breaking ties, including
intermediate archetypes that exemplify important issues in
collective action, such as various types of coordination and
defection problems. We present a list of archetypal games that
model situations of power, conflict, and cooperation as
landmarks for understanding diversity in elementary strategic
situations. Selected additional archetypes illustrate overlapping
problems of collective action, including trust, externalities, and
biased advantage and disadvantage in opportunities and results.
Primal archetypes
Simple games with two “likes” and two “dislikes”, i.e., ties for the
two highest and two lowest ranked outcomes, offer interesting
examples of elementary interdependence in social or strategic
situations, in which each person’s outcomes may depend on what
the other person does. Robinson et al. (unpublished manuscript 
https://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/download?doi=10.1.1.619.4992&rep=
rep1&type=pdf) pointed out that this class of payoff structures
includes “archetypal games” that exemplify collective action
problems, such as the simplest coordination game. Fig. 2 (left side)
shows three symmetric primal archetypes matching the situations
described in the introduction. In “Primal Independence,” each
player can act on their own to achieve their preference (i.e., “we
go our separate ways”). Primal Coordination requires joint action
to select between alternative equilibria (as in “drive on the left or
on the right”). In “Primal Exchange,” each controls the partner’s
outcome while having no control over their own payoff (as in “my
mask protects you, your mask protects me”).  
The payoff patterns for Primal Independence, Primal
Coordination, and Primal Exchange combine to form five
asymmetric archetypes. These asymmetric archetypes can model
patterns of power, dependence, and conflict. In “Primal Help,”
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one actor’s decision empowers the other actor to have a choice,
enabling a result where both obtain their best outcome. Kelley et
al. (2003) describe this result as a “helping hand.” In “Primal
Gift,” one actor’s choice determines that both reach win-win,
regardless of what the other does, benevolently “making us both
win.” Primal Gift would also be an archetype for situations in
which one person has sufficient incentive to provide a collective
good, which then benefits others, what Olson (1971) called a
“privileged” group. In “Primal Win-Lose,” one’s choice
determines that the first actor gets the best outcome and the other
gets the worst, a “best for me, worst for you” result. Finally,
interchanging columns (or rows) for one actor in Primal
Coordination and combining the resulting payoff pattern with
the original pattern for Primal Coordination creates “Primal
Conflict.” From each outcome, one person would always prefer
to change their move, creating a cyclic game. This situation is
often called “Matching Pennies,” based on a simple game with
coins that has an equivalent payoff structure. Kelley et al. (2003)
summarize this result as “match or mismatch.” It represents a
zero-sum conflict of completely opposed interests whereby if  one
person gains, the other loses.  
Each row in Fig. 2 has the same pattern of payoffs for the Row
actor and each column has the same pattern for the Column actor.
Neighboring games are linked by payoff swaps that switch the
ranking of two outcomes. This situation can be visualized as
moving one of the 4s into a different cell. Swapping a 4 for Column
horizontally, for example, moves to the right, turning Primal
Independence into Primal Help, i.e., in the next column of games.
Swapping a highest payoff (4) for Row results in moving up into
the next row of games, for example, turning Primal Help into
Primal Coordination. Thus, this diagram maps possible
transformations between one payoff structure and another,
“changing the game.”
Families of archetypes
Breaking ties creates more complex games, as in the three families
of descendants from primal archetypes (Fig. 3). These families
contain games that differ in shared characteristics such as
coordination in selecting between multiple equilibria, dominant
strategies leading to a single equilibrium with relatively good
results, or motivations to defect from a Pareto-optimal outcome.
Primal Coordination differentiates into a Convention game by
breaking ties symmetrically for the highest ranked payoffs, so both
receive a higher payoff in one of the two equilibria. This situation
exemplifies conventions and norms that coordinate on a mutually
preferred equilibrium outcome such as driving on the right.
Schelling (1960) suggested that such situations with multiple
equilibria could be resolved by identifying a prominent focal point
based on some salient characteristic. In Lewis’s (2002) discussion
of the role of conventions, culture can provide focal points for
coordination. The Convention payoff structure is sometimes
known as “Hi-lo,” and is used to analyze the problem of
coordinating selection of an equilibrium with higher payoff for
both (Gold and Colman 2020).  
Breaking ties in Primal Coordination so that the equilibria have
different payoffs for each actor creates games with rivalry among
alternative equilibria whereby one or the other does better. Game
theorists often discuss this kind of coordination problem in terms
Fig. 3. Primal archetypes generate diverse games. Breaking high
ties and low ties differentiates the three symmetric primal
archetypes into families of games with two equally ranked
outcomes (ties) for each actor and into the 12 strict symmetric
ordinal games, with four ranked payoffs and no ties. Moving
from left to right, payoffs from breaking ties are underlined.
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of the “Battle of the Sexes” story about two people who want to
do something together but differ about what each would most like
for their joint entertainment (Luce and Raiffa 1957). Such models
have been used to analyze international relations between rival
nations, each seeking its own advantage (Snidal 1985). In an
environmental example, fishing sites may yield different
production potential; to reduce unproductive conflict, lotteries
to assign fishing spots could provide a coordination mechanism
for a fair solution (Kaivanto 2018).  
Convention and “Rivalry” are intermediate archetypes, with a
single pair of ties for each actor, showing indifference between
the two lowest ranked outcomes. Breaking ties in the lowest
ranked payoffs in Rivalry then creates two strict (no ties) games
with four ranked outcomes and rival equilibria (“Hero” and
“Leader”). These games differ in the payoff for the actor who
changes their move away from a risk-minimizing strategy that
avoids the worst outcome for both. In one situation, the Leader
does best, whereas in the other situation, the Hero gets second-
best (Rapoport 1967).  
Breaking low ties in Convention generates two games. In “Safe
Choice,” avoiding risk also maximizes payoff. However, in
“Assurance,” if  both players cooperate, they can both get the best
outcome; however, there is a risk of getting the worst outcome if
the other player does not cooperate, so cooperation conflicts with
caution. This game (and “Stag Hunt,” discussed below) can model
issues such as trust and thresholds (tipping points/critical mass)
for cooperation in general (Sen 1967, Skyrms 2003), among
herders (Runge 1981, Cole and Grossman 2010), for political
mobilization (Heckathorn 1996, Oliver and Marwell 2001), and
in irrigation technology adoption (Müller et al. 2018).  
Breaking high ties in Primal Independence generates another
family of games. In “Synergy,” cooperation makes both players
better off. Alternatively, breaking ties in Primal Independence
generates a situation with a “Second-Best” equilibrium. Breaking
low ties in Second-Best generates descendant games that differ in
the alignment of the two lowest ranked payoffs: “Deadlock” and
“Compromise.” In either case, the equilibrium with second-best
payoffs is also the least risky choice. In this case, it is also the
choice that offers a chance of getting the best outcome if  the other
player makes a mistake (“trembling hand”).  
Primal Exchange, in which each player controls the partner’s fate,
differentiates to form the three most famous and well-studied 2 ×
2 models of collective action: Prisoner’s Dilemma, “Chicken,”
and Stag Hunt. In these social dilemmas (broadly defined), selfish
motives conflict with cooperation (Dawes 1980, Kollock 1998,
Van Lange et al. 2014). In Prisoner’s Dilemma, incentives lead
away from cooperation to converge on an inferior equilibrium
outcome. A narrow definition of social dilemmas would be
restricted to situations in which dominant strategies lead to an
inferior equilibrium, and further restricted to those in which both
players “cooperating” would be better than taking turns
“defecting.” However, social dilemmas are often discussed more
loosely in terms of a variety of conflicts between individual and
collective interests and temptations to defect from cooperation.
These dilemmas are often discussed as free-rider problems (Olson
1971). In Chicken, incentives lead away from cooperation to rival
equilibria in which one or the other player does best and the other
gets second-worst, but with the risk of both getting the worst
outcome. Stag Hunt poses a conflict between cooperation to get
the outcome that is best for both vs. cautious risk avoidance
leading to second-worst for both, similar to the Assurance
problem discussed above (Medina 2007). The fourth descendant
of Primal Exchange, “Concord,” is called “Max-Diff” by social
psychologists. In this situation, dominant strategies could lead
harmoniously to a win-win outcome. However, a competitive
actor concerned with their own relative advantage and expecting
the other actor to follow their dominant strategy might forego
win-win, trying to get an unequal outcome in which they do
relatively better (Kelley and Thibaut 1978). Such an approach
risks getting caught in a spiteful dynamic of “beggar thy
neighbor” in which both players end up at the worst outcome.  
Starting from the three primal archetypes, breaking ties ultimately
generates 12 strict symmetric ordinal games (Fig. 3, right side).
Thus, differentiating each primal archetype generates a family of
games descending from a common ancestor. The reverse process
of simplification, i.e., making ties, creates simpler intermediate
games, which can be seen as lying “in between” the strict games.
In Appendix 1, we further describe asymmetric descendants for
all the primal archetypes and relationships between the resulting
families of models within the topology of 2 × 2 games.
Archetypal games
We summarize names and brief  descriptions for eight primal
archetypes and eight intermediate archetypes in Table 2. This
summary combines games derived by simplification or
differentiation (Figs. 2 and 3) along with a few additional
archetypes (Fig. 4). The 2 × 2 game identifiers use a binomial
nomenclature based on how payoff patterns for the 38 symmetric
ordinal 2 × 2 games combine to form asymmetric games (Table
2; Bruns 2015). This nomenclature provides a way to identify
ordinal games uniquely, including cases in which the same ordinal
payoff structure may be discussed using different names, as with
Chicken, “Hawk-Dove,” and “Snowdrift.”
Fig. 4. Payoff matrices for additional intermediate archetypes:
Trust Dilemma (Rousseau’s Hunt), Volunteer’s Dilemma,
Jekyll-Hyde, and Advantage.
Kelley et al. (2003) illustrate the situations (entries) in An Atlas
of Interpersonal Situations using payoff matrices with various
values. Standardizing payoff ranks to 1–4 and aligning best
payoffs (with Row’s 4 right and Column’s 4 up) makes ordinally
equivalent matrices that facilitate identifying and comparing
games (Robinson and Goforth 2005, Bruns 2015). Appendix 1
(Fig. A10) presents ordinal equivalents for the atlas entries.
Standardizing the payoff matrices shows that the examples of the
three “single-component” games of independence, coordination,
and exchange identified by Kelley et al. (2003) have the same
ordinal structure as the simple archetypal games identified by
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“We go our separate ways;” all incentives lead to win-win; each actor controls
their own outcome; AIS: BAC Bilateral Actor (Reflexive) Control
DhDh, Double
Harmony
1 2, 3, A2, A4,
A7–10
P1.1 Synergy “Best together;” fully aligned incentives lead to a win-win outcome for both
actors; between Harmony and Peace; AIS: Cooperation
LhLh, Low
Harmony
p. 85 3, A2, A4,
A6, A8
P1.2 Second-Best “Good enough;” dominant strategies lead to compromise on second-best;
between Deadlock and Compromise




Joint control; “getting in sync;” selection between equally good equilibria; AIS:
Corresponding Mutual Joint (Behavior) Control
DoDo, Double
Coordination
3 1–3, A1, A4,
A6–10
P2.1 Convention Norm; Hi-Lo; “drive on the right;” two equilibria, one is better for both actors,
payoff-dominant; between Safe Choice and Assurance
LoLo, Low
Coordination
(3) 1, 3, A1,
A4–6, A8–
10
P2.2 Rivalry “Whose favorite?” One or the other actor does best at rival equilibria; between
Hero and Leader; AIS: Hero “Let’s do it your way”




“I’ll scratch your back if  you scratch mine;” each actor controls the other’s
outcome; win-win focal point; AIS: MPC Mutual Partner (Fate) Control
DuDu, Double
Hunt




Matching Pennies; “match or mismatch;” zero-sum game of complete conflict:
one actor’s gain is always the other’s loss; cyclic: someone always wants to
change their choice (Double Coordination and Interchanged Double




4 2, A1, A4,
A7, A10










P6 Primal Gift Benevolence; “you make us both win;” dependent win-win; privileged group;
dominant strategy ensures both win; AIS: Concordant unilateral dependence
DhDu p. 48 2, A1, A4,
A7, A10
P7 Primal Favors “Returning the favor;” one actor can ensure the other wins, in which case, the
other can also make the first win; a cross between coordination and exchange;
one has partner control while the other has joint control; AIS: Asymmetric
dependence




Frustration; vanquish; “best for me, worst for you;” dominant strategy makes
other actor lose; parental override in “desert only after dinner” (Double Hunt




11.1 2, A1, A4,
A7, A10
Additional middle ties archetypes
M1 Trust
Dilemma
Rousseau’s Hunt; “work together?” caution conflicts with cooperation;
assurance problem of mutual trust; avoiding the worst outcome (maximin
strategy) leads to the Pareto-inferior equilibrium; choosing the cooperative
move if  the other actor does not is worst; indifferent about other actor’s
outcome; between Assurance and Stag Hunt. AIS: Conjunctive
Interdependence; “together we can do it”
MuMu, Middle
Hunt




“Let George do it;” everyone wants it done, but prefers that someone else pays
the cost; between Chicken and Leader; AIS: Disjunctive Interdependence
MbMb, Middle
Battle
10 4, A4, A6,
A8, A10
M3 Jekyll-Hyde Middle Threat; “one kind, one cruel;” incentives induce positive externalities by
one actor and negative externalities by the other; dominant strategies lead to
one actor doing better, but the other actor can threaten to make both worse off
unless given a more equitable result, e.g., by taking turns or changing the rules





 †Game identifiers from Bruns (2015).
‡Game (or its strategic issues) discussed under this entry code or page number in Kelley et al. (2003).
§Numbers refer to associated figures in the paper and Appendix 1.
Robinson et al. (unpublished manuscript https://citeseerx.ist.psu.
edu/viewdoc/download?doi=10.1.1.619.4992&rep=rep1&type=pdf).
More generally, a standardized way of presenting payoffs makes
it easier to see the relationships between different games and to
compare research from different sources (Robinson and Goforth
2005, Bruns 2015). We put the games identified by Kelley et al.
(2003) into context by showing how different games are
systematically related through recombining payoff patterns and
making and breaking ties. The topology of payoff swaps in 2 × 2
games (Robinson and Goforth 2005), and the “periodic table”
display (Appendix 1), offer a visualization that elegantly displays
a complex pattern of overlapping relationships. This framework
improves on the branching taxonomy suggested by Rapoport et
al. (1976) and maps the overlapping properties categorized by
Holzinger (2008; see also Holzinger, unpublished manuscript 
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https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.399140). Families of archetypal
games can offer a somewhat simpler way to see and understand
these relationships among different 2 × 2 game theory models. In
Appendix 1, we discuss additional ways of analyzing how the
potential for cooperative solutions varies between social
situations, including dimensions for best response Nash
equilibria, coordination, and externalities (Guisasola and Saari
2020).  
Several of these archetypal games have also been highlighted by
previous researchers. In their synthesis of research on 2 × 2 games,
Rapoport et al. (1976) concentrated on strict games (those
without ties). However, they also included the payoff structure
for Primal Exchange as one of the few non-strict games (games
with ties), listed as game #79. They listed Primal Coordination
as game #85. Aruka (2001) analyzed Primal Exchange as the
Avatamsaka game.  
In addition to primal archetypes, we list selected intermediate
archetypes that exemplify important situations for collective
action (Table 2). These situations include synergy from aligned
incentives, compromise on second-best, conventions favoring one
of multiple equilibria, and rivalry over alternative equilibria. The
payoff structure of the “Defection Dilemma” (between Prisoner’s
Dilemma and Chicken in Fig. 3) has occasionally been noted in
game theory literature, for example, by Rapoport et al. (1976).
However, it does not seem to have been applied much for analyzing
collective action. For this reason, Defection Dilemma, and the
“Offer” game (between Concord and Stag Hunt) are not listed as
intermediate archetypes. However, the topology of 2 × 2 games
provides a framework that analysts can use to identify additional
archetypes to suit their needs. For example, some descendants of
Primal Exchange and Primal Combination are cyclic but have
Pareto-optimal outcomes that offer attractive focal points for
cooperation (Appendix 1).  
When primal archetypes differentiate by breaking ties, their
emergent properties converge in some cases, despite starting from
different primal archetypes. Primal Exchange differentiates into
Stag Hunt, which entails a coordination conflict between risk and
trust, similar to Assurance, even though Assurance descends from
Primal Coordination. Making middle ties (equalizing the second-
and third-ranked outcomes) creates an intermediate game
between Assurance and Stag Hunt. In a sense, this game bridges
the border between two archetypal families, revealing the process
of emergent convergence in the properties of 2 × 2 game theory
models. This game (see Fig. 4) represents an intermediate
archetype for Assurance and Stag Hunt problems of mutual trust,
a “Trust Dilemma.” Rousseau (2004) described a hunter choosing
between the certainty of getting a hare or sharing a stag if  the
others cooperate. With no concern for the other’s outcome, the
remaining outcomes would be ranked equally (Rousseau 2004).
Hence, this Trust Dilemma (Cronk and Leech 2013) could also
be called “Rousseau’s Hunt.”  
Primal Exchange also differentiates into Chicken, which shares
the problem of coordination between rival equilibria with Leader
and Hero, another example of emergent convergence. Forming
middle ties between Chicken and Leader makes “Volunteer’s
Dilemma” (see Fig. 4), in which all players would like something
done but prefer that the other player does it (Diekmann 1985).
Volunteer’s Dilemma was also one of the entries in An Atlas of
Interpersonal Situations (Kelley et al. 2003). Volunteer’s Dilemma
also bridges between families descended from Primal
Coordination and Primal Exchange.
Asymmetry, mismatched externalities, and structural bias
Because many situations in life are not symmetric in terms of
opportunities or results, asymmetric games deserve more
attention for understanding social situations and collective action
(Thurow 1975, Ernst 2005, Hauser et al. 2019, Nockur et al. 2020).
Asymmetry is relevant to relationships of inequality such as
parent-child, teacher-student, supervisor-subordinate, principal-
agent, and ruler-ruled, and is also relevant to differences related
to factors including, but not limited to, power, knowledge, gender,
race, ethnicity, class, education, productivity, and wealth.
Examples in social-ecological systems include head- and tail-
enders in irrigation (Ostrom and Gardner 1993, Janssen et al.
2011), and unequal access to electricity supply for irrigation
pumps (Kimmich 2013).  
“Jekyll-Hyde” (see Fig. 4) is a particularly interesting asymmetric
game discussed by Kelley et al. (2003) in terms of threat dynamics
and has distinctive externalities analyzed by Robinson and
Goforth (2005). Robinson and Goforth (2005) examined how the
arrangement of incentives and externalities could create common
or conflicting interests, systematizing earlier work by Schelling
(1960) and building on Greenberg’s (1990) analysis of inducement
correspondences. In contrast to situations of pure common
interest or complete conflict, Robinson and Goforth (2005)
identified “Type” games, such as the payoff structure in Jekyll-
Hyde, which exemplify mismatched situations. For each of the
other person’s choices, one actor’s incentives always induce moves
that give the other a higher payoff, whereas the other person’s
incentives always induce moves that give the first person a lower
payoff. One person’s choices would always have positive
externalities and the other’s choices would always have negative
externalities. In a sense, incentives make one cruel and one kind,
one harms and one helps.  
In Jekyll-Hyde, both players have dominant strategies, and this
structure favors one actor who gets their best outcome while the
other does worse. Kelley et al. (2003) analyze this situation in
terms of the threat that the other actor might be able to make.
This situation resembles the Basic Threat game discussed earlier
and the Strict Threat game studied by Guyer and Rapoport
(1970). In some cases, the actor who does worse might accept the
inequality as an act of “loyalty.” However, with communication
or repeated interaction, the disadvantaged actor might threaten
to deprive the first actor of their best outcome unless given a more
equitable result, i.e., “justice.” An agreeable solution might be
achieved, for example, by taking turns, using side payments, or
changing rules to transform the situation into a win-win game.  
In the asymmetric game “Advantage,” only one actor has a
dominant strategy and they end up doing best at equilibrium.
This is a descendant of Primal Help. Advantage can reflect a crude
model of rent-based accumulation in which “the rich get richer.”
It is an intermediate archetype for the “Protector” game used by
Snyder and Diesing (1978) in their models of international
relations. Advantage and Jekyll-Hyde are part of a large set of
what we call “bias games.” In this type of asymmetric situation,
dominant strategies for one or both actors create a single
equilibrium that favors one actor while the other does worse.
Ecology and Society 26(4): 2
https://www.ecologyandsociety.org/vol26/iss4/art2/
These have been called “suasion games” (Martin 1992) because
the dissatisfied or “aggrieved” (Stein 1982) actor may try to
change the game through persuasion or other means. They have
also been called “Rambo” games (Zürn 1993, Hasenclever et al.
1997, Holzinger 2008) because one actor can get their way without
having to compromise.  
Asymmetric situations with an unequal equilibrium outcome can
make the disadvantaged actor want to find a way to change the
outcome, by persuasion, threats, requesting compensatory side
payments, or changing the rules to obtain a better outcome. In
the topology of possible 2 × 2 games (Appendix 1), bias games,
i.e., those with dominant strategies leading to unequal outcomes
at a single equilibrium, are more common than games with equal
equilibrium payoffs. In the payoff space of possible 2 × 2 games,
the inequality (distributional) problems of bias games, as
exemplified by Advantage and Jekyll-Hyde, are much more
prevalent than the efficiency problems of Pareto-inferior
equilibria in tragic dilemmas and assurance problems. Bias games
are another example of how a better menu of models can
contribute to understanding institutional diversity in power,
conflict, and unequal results.  
The 2 × 2 games show cross-cutting problems of collective action
(Holzinger 2008): failure or success in achieving Pareto-optimal
results; assurance or disagreement problems in choosing among
multiple equilibria; and unequal distribution of benefits; as well
as instability and zero-sum conflict. The topology of payoff swaps
in 2 × 2 games displays similar differences between games
according to the presence, Pareto-efficiency, and distribution of
equilibrium payoffs (Robinson and Goforth 2005, Bruns 2015).
Analysis of archetypes (e.g., Fig. 3; Figs. A1 and A2 in Appendix
1) reveals how families of games descended from primal
archetypes display overlapping types of collective action
problems:  
. Risk and rivalry in coordinating equilibrium selection, 
. Dealing with damaging externalities of defection from
exchange, 
. Settling for the good or pursuing the best amidst partial
harmony, 
. Coping with instability and opposed (zero-sum) interests, 
. Finding feasible focal points for cooperation in the absence
of stable equilibrium solutions, and 
. Structural advantage and disadvantage generating
inequality.
DISCUSSION
Archetypes in changing systems
Archetypes have been applied to recognize and analyze recurrent
patterns in the dynamics of systems (Senge 1990, Kim and
Anderson 1998). In systems dynamics, archetypes highlight
typical positive and negative feedback loops. Overuse and
deterioration of a shared resource, as in a tragedy of the commons,
is one archetype; another is competitive escalation of threatening
actions with potential collapse, as in the game of Chicken; a third
is breakdown in trust, as in Stag Hunt and Assurance problems.
Archetypal patterns show how deliberate actions can have
unintended consequences. Reinforcing feedbacks can create
additional problems, whereas balancing feedbacks can restrict
achievement. System archetypes reveal how a more holistic
perspective, looking over time and across boundaries, may help
in designing suitable solutions (Wolstenholme 2003). System
archetypes offer generic models of processes that can be adapted
to analyze current conditions or assess planned changes (Braun,
unpublished manuscript https://www.albany.edu/faculty/gpr/
PAD724/724WebArticles/sys_archetypes.pdf). Transformations
between archetypes illustrate changes in the structure and
dynamics of systems (Greenwood and Hinings 1993).  
As examples for social-ecological systems, analysis using system
archetypes can offer a holistic understanding of limits to growth
and related tragedy of the commons problems in water resources
management, providing insights into options for management
and monitoring (Bahaddin et al. 2018). Comparative analysis of
pasture social-ecological systems illustrates how archetypes can
provide more general insights into the dynamics of problems and
potential solutions, including whether archetypes of different
system problems are linked or independent (Neudert et al. 2019).
As with generic system dynamics archetypes, the archetypal
games identified here can provide a menu of models for use in
analyzing social-ecological systems.  
Archetypal models of interdependence offer insights into
incentive structures, their dynamics, and potential transformations.
Archetypes can help to go beyond a tendency to concentrate on
the (often misdiagnosed and not inevitable) tragedy of the
commons and its two-person analog, Prisoner’s Dilemma, and
instead consider a broader range of models for situations and the
challenges and opportunities they pose for environmental
governance, including, but not limited to, various coordination
and defection problems. Archetypes can act as building blocks or
components to understand forces favoring and hindering
cooperation, not only for static equilibrium situations, but also
as archetypal models of potential pathways for transformation,
such as the following.  
. Aligned incentives for independent action may shift to yield
synergy whereby cooperation makes both actors better off
or may transform toward compromise to settle on second-
best; 
. Norms facilitate coordination. However, coordination
problems could turn into contestation over rival options or
tension between cautious risk avoidance and trust that could
assure cooperation, such as investing in a new technology.
For example, although there may be an official requirement
to adopt quality-approved irrigation pumps, farmers may
stick with poor-quality pumps when nobody else conforms,
leaving all in a low-equilibrium trap of a deteriorating
electricity system (Kimmich 2013); 
. Social dilemmas and other descendants from Primal
Exchange share incentive structures in which individuals are
motivated to defect from cooperation. They also share an
underlying interdependency of actors’ power over each
other’s outcomes. For repeated interaction, this situation
may provide the power to create cooperation, as in the simple
check-and-balance reciprocity embodied in tit-for-tat
(Axelrod 1984) or through more sophisticated strategies
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(Press and Dyson 2012). Transformation into a Stag Hunt
or Concord situation may offer an escape from defection
problems in social dilemmas, such as controlling emissions
of greenhouse gasses to cope with climate change (Bruns
2022); 
. Asymmetric power could be arranged to enable, to
benevolently ensure, or to paternalistically prohibit a desired
outcome. The arrangement of power may also shift between
these and other structures, for example, from benevolent
despotism to authority that allows at least a semblance of
choice (a “Hobson’s choice”) or more genuinely empowering
assistance (Ellerman 2005); 
. Action that also helps another person to succeed, resulting
in success for both, could turn into a more unbalanced
relationship in which one or the other does better. A repeated
version of the Advantage game illustrates the positive
feedback loops of the “success to the successful” systems
dynamics archetype (Kim and Anderson 1998) in which “the
rich get richer,” amplifying inequality as one person gets “the
lion’s share,” and; 
. Advantage, Jekyll-Hyde, and other bias games illustrate how
structural incentives that lead to unsatisfactory outcomes
may stimulate efforts to change the situation. Asymmetric
incentive structures often lead toward unequal results that
could encourage attempts to negotiate, resist, exit, or change
the rules and results of the game.
Organizational configurations in an ecology of games
Researchers have used archetypes to characterize businesses and
other organizations and the relationships between organizations.
Such archetypes comprise sets of variables based on typologies
deduced from theoretical concepts or from taxonomies
inductively based on empirical observation (see reviews by Miller
and Friesen 1978, Greenwood and Hinings 1993, Meyer et al.
1993, Short et al. 2008, Misangyi et al. 2017). The difference
between coordination and defection problems appears in how
relationships within or between firms may depend on convergent
or divergent incentive structures (Grandori 1997, Meuer 2014).
In situations with convergent incentives (as with descendants of
Primal Coordination and Primal Independence), communitarian
strategies that emphasize information sharing, teamwork,
coordination, and trust may lead to better performance. Other
situations have divergent incentives, such as temptations to defect
from cooperation (as with descendants of Primal Exchange).
These situations might be controlled better through bureaucratic
structures and procedures if  problems and outcomes are
predictable. However, when situations with divergent incentives
are more complex or outcomes are more uncertain, an alternative
solution may be to create shared incentives through ex-post
benefits from property rights, as in a joint venture.  
Qualitative comparative analysis provides a way to analyze
organizational archetypes in different situations, looking at
strategic configurations of organization attributes together with
information on contexts and performance. As a means of
understanding institutional diversity, qualitative comparative
analysis can examine which sets of conditions are causally
necessary or sufficient for outcomes and which are complements
or substitutes, for example, in assessing the effectiveness of
organizational strategies (Ragin 2008, Fiss et al. 2013, Grandori
and Furnari 2013, Greckhamer et al. 2018, Villamayor-Tomas et
al. 2020). Qualitative comparative analysis and game theory can
also be used to study networks of games in social-ecological
systems (Kimmich and Villamayor-Tomas 2019).  
Differences may exist in the prevalence of coordination or
defection problems in an interorganizational ecology of games in
water governance, and such problems could affect the choice of
institutions for coping with such challenges (Long 1958, Berardo
and Scholz 2010, Lubell et al. 2010, Berardo and Lubell 2019).
Thus, in networks of organizations, relationships may mainly
concern building bridging social capital for mutual understanding
and trust between groups or may instead emphasize bonding
social capital within groups to overcome temptations to defect
from cooperation. When adjacent action situations are
interdependent in networks (McGinnis 2011), different situations
may face different problems for collective action, and solving
coordination problems may also resolve adjacent social dilemmas
(Kimmich and Sagebiel 2016, Kimmich and Villamayor-Tomas
2019). Archetypal configurations and their potential prevalence
in different contexts may help to explain observed patterns of
organizational behavior, illuminate challenges and potential
solutions, and contribute to designing improved institutions and
monitoring their outcomes.
Elementary patterns of power in governance
The primal archetypes exemplify various forms of power: “power
to,” “power with,” and “power over.” Primal Independence
exemplifies “power to” as capability or freedom to act
independently on one’s own (Sen 2000, Nussbaum 2011). Primal
Coordination typifies “power with” to achieve mutual outcomes
through cooperation (Follett 1924, Ostrom 1997), as in joint
production and coproduction. The symmetrically balanced
power in Primal Exchange is technically a reciprocal form of
“power over.” However, as long as it stays balanced, it could
function as “power with” to obtain mutual gains in an equitable
partnership. Maintaining such a potentially precarious balance
could depend on mutual adjustment, including voice and exit, as
with responsive governance and availability of competitive
options (Polanyi 1951, Ostrom et al. 1961, Hirschman 1970).
“Power with” could also occur if  “power over” is combined with
“power with” in an asymmetric but still somewhat balanced way,
as when coordination and exchange payoff patterns blend
together in Primal Favors. One partner could ensure that the other
partner gets a best outcome, but they need to have the favor
returned through the other’s choice. Primal Favors could also
generate a variety of asymmetric situations with more unequal
results (see Appendix 1). Another three primal games offer
exemplars of asymmetric “power over”: enabling a choice to win
in Primal Help, determining that both actors win in Primal Gift,
or determining that one actor gets their best outcome and the
other their worst in Primal Win-Lose.  
The three symmetric primal archetypes also offer elementary
models of principles for organizing social order based on liberty,
association, and exchange. Asymmetric power could enable
autonomy, ensure a benevolent outcome, or despotically
determine who wins and who loses. The primal archetypes for
asymmetric power can model governance in ruler-ruled
relationships in which the choices of rulers who hold power
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(executive, governor, collective choice in a legislature, parent, etc.)
grant permission, impose a preferred outcome, or prohibit
someone from getting their preference. In institutional grammar,
deontic rules determine whether someone subject to the rules may,
must, or must not do something (Crawford and Ostrom 1995).
Thus, archetypal games illustrate elementary relationships that
shape social order and governance. These relationships contrast
with the cyclic instability and zero-sum opposition of interests in
Primal Conflict, as in a “war of all against all” (Hobbes 1651,
Ostrom et al. 1992, Ostrom 1997). Archetypal games offer models
to help understand and diagnose governance relationships while
showing how simple archetypes generate a diversity of more
complex situations.
CONCLUSIONS
Analysis of archetypal games affirms the value of distinguishing
coordination problems of equilibrium selection from defection
problems in social dilemmas and similar situations while tracing
how various kinds of coordination or defection problems are
related. In turn, these archetypes are part of a larger diversity of
situations that pose challenges and opportunities for collective
action, including cyclic conflict, asymmetric power, and structural
advantage and disadvantage in opportunities and results.
Archetypal games show convergence of ideas and potential for
further application in understanding transformations in system
dynamics; coordination, defection, and other types of problems
among networked organizations; best response, coordination,
and externality dimensions of behavior in situations of
interdependence; and diversity of elementary patterns of power
in governance.  
Making ties (indifference) between two outcomes for each actor
in strict ordinal 2 × 2 games forms archetypes for harmony, social
conventions and norms, compromise on second-best, rivalry,
Assurance/Stag Hunt tensions between caution and trust in
cooperation, and structural bias of advantage and disadvantage.
Simplifying payoff rankings to like two outcomes and dislike two
outcomes yields three primal archetypes for independence,
coordination, and exchange. These symmetric patterns of power
combine to create asymmetric models for conflict and structures
of power and dependence. Breaking ties differentiates primal
archetypes to generate further diversity in interdependence. Half
of the primal archetypes generate strict games with relatively good
results at equilibrium (best or second-best) while the other half
generate a diverse and less stable set of games, most of which yield
poor outcomes or severe inequality. Families of games that are
descended from primal archetypes display overlapping collective
action problems, including risk and rivalry in equilibrium
selection, externalities of defection from exchange, partial
harmony of good and best, zero-sum opposition of interests, focal
points for cooperation, and the prevalence of unequal outcomes
at equilibrium.  
Simple two-person two-choice games, with ties showing
indifference between outcomes, model archetypal situations of
interdependence. These archetypes offer insights into similarities,
diversity, and potential transformations in social-ecological
systems, challenges for cooperation in resource management, and
opportunities for improving environmental governance.
Archetypes offer starting points and building blocks for
understanding more complex situations, networks of action
situations, and comparative analysis. Archetypal games can help
expand thinking and analysis beyond a few famous games and
trace cascading connections in a menu of models for thinking
about the diversity and dynamics of interdependent relationships.
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Appendix. Archetypes in the topology of 2x2 games 
 
Appendix to Bruns, B., and C. Kimmich. 2021. Archetypal games generate diverse models of 
power, conflict, and cooperation. Ecology and Society. 
 
Graphical abstract. Simplifying two-person two-choice (2x2) games by making ties in payoff 
ranks (indifference between outcomes) derives three primal archetypes of interdependence. 
Payoff patterns from the symmetric archetypes for independence, coordination, and exchange 
combine to form asymmetric archetypes for power, dependence, and conflict. Breaking ties in 
primal archetypes generates intermediate archetypes for synergy, compromise, conventions, 
rivalry, and advantage. Archetypal games provide a menu of models for understanding 
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1. Introduction to the appendix  
 
This appendix provides further results and discussion about families of asymmetric 
archetypes, the topology of 2x2 games, games with ties that lie between the strict ordinal 
games, the prevalence of bias games, payoff matrices for examples of interdependence, 
changing preferences, dimensions of interdependence, and some limitations and extensions of 
this approach to archetypal games.  
 
The main paper identified archetypes for 2x2 games and showed how they generate diverse 
models for interdependence: 
 
• Simple game theory models of independence, coordination, and exchange combine 
payoff patterns to make asymmetric situations of power, dependence and conflict.  
• These archetypal games differentiate (by breaking ties in outcome rankings) to 
generate archetypes for synergy, compromise, conventions, rivalry, and advantage.  
• Archetypal games offer a menu of models for understanding institutional diversity and 
transformation in social-ecological systems.  
 
This appendix discusses how archetypes fit into the topology of 2x2 games. In a sense, the 
topology of 2x2 games provides an intellectual framework and scaffolding for identifying 
archetypal games. The main paper introduces families of archetypal games, while this 
appendix puts the archetypal games into the context of the topology of 2x2 games.  
 
• Breaking ties in primal archetypes generates families of strict 2x2 games.  
• The topology of payoff swaps in two-person two-choice (2x2) games maps 
overlapping relationships among archetypes with various challenges for cooperation.  
• Ties make simpler games between strict 2x2 games.  
• Making high ties and low ties in the strict 2x2 games derives primal archetypes 
including variants equivalent by interchanging rows and columns.  
• Symmetric 2x2 games mostly offer relatively good outcomes at equilibrium (best or 
second-best) except for an unstable region around Prisoner’s Dilemma.  
• Most 2x2 games have unequal payoffs at equilibrium 
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• Standardizing payoff matrices shows equivalence in models between the Atlas of 
Interpersonal Situations and the topology of 2x2 games.  
• Making and breaking ties represents changes in preferences. There are many reasons 
why payoff values might change.  
• Archetypal games illustrate dimensions of independence including Nash best response 
equilibria, coordination, and externalities.   
• The ways in which simple archetypes generate more diverse situations offer tools for 
understanding similarity and diversity in interdependence.  
 
2. Asymmetric archetypes differentiate into families of hotspots and pipes 
 
Figures A1 and A2 show how all eight primal archetypes differentiate into symmetric and 
asymmetric descendants.  
 
• Primal Coordination differentiates into games with rival equilibria or games where 
achieving the best payoff for both may conflict with avoiding risk.  
• Primal Conflict, also known as Matching Pennies, differentiates into a family of cyclic 
games with no equilibria. These are situations of completely opposed interests where 
if one gains the other does worse.  
• Primal Win-Lose yields further asymmetric inequality in high bias (4,2) games where 
one gets second-worst at equilibrium.  
• Primal Gift, Primal Independence, and Helping Hand produce families of games with 
relatively good outcomes that each contain win-win (4,4), moderate bias (4,3), and 
second-best (3,3) outcomes.  
• Primal Exchange and Primal Combination have particularly diverse descendants, 
including asymmetric dilemmas with inefficient equilibria, games with highly unequal 
(4,2) equilibrium outcomes, and cyclic games where a focal point (4,3 or 3,3) could 
offer a Pareto-optimal solution better than cyclic instability or the poor payoff from a 
mixed strategy. Most of these games, including the social dilemmas of Prisoner’s 
Dilemma, Chicken, and Stag Hunt as well as their asymmetric neighbors, share 
defection problems where there are motivations to move away from a cooperative 
Pareto-optimal solution and instead become trapped in a result that is unsatisfactory 
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Figure A1. Hotspot families. Primal archetypes for Coordination, Conflict, Win-lose, and 
Gift differentiate into two tiles composed of four strict ordinal games linked by low swaps 
(1><2).  
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Figure A2. Pipe families. Primal archetypes for Exchange, Independence (Harmony), Favors, 
and Help differentiate into four tiles with sixteen strict games.  
      
 
  
Ch Pd Ch Ch Ch Hr Ch Ba Ba Pd Ba Ch
2 4 3 3 2 4 3 3 2 4 3 1 2 4 3 2 3 4 2 3 3 4 2 3
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Exchange Sh Pd Sh Ch  Favors Sh Hr Sh Ba Favors Ba Nc Ba Sh
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Ln Ld 2 2 3 1 2 1 3 2 Ln Lb 2 2 3 3 2 1 3 3 Lb Ln 1 1 4 2 1 2 4 1
1 4 4 3 Asym Dilemma Endless 1 4 4 1 Crisis Cycle Inspector 3 3 1 4 Samson Inspector
1 1 3 1 Nc Pd Nc Ch 1 1 3 3 Nc Hr Nc Ba 1 1 4 1 Hr Nc Hr Sh
Uneq. Exchange  2 4 4 3 2 4 4 3 Okay Focus 2 4 4 1 2 4 4 2 Okay Focus 3 3 1 4 3 3 1 4
1 2 3 1 1 1 3 2 1 2 3 3 1 1 3 3 2 1 4 2 2 2 4 1
Threat Dove-Hawk Samson LbLn:Okay Focus Crisis
Ch Nc Ch Sh Ch Co Ch As As Pd As Ch
2 3 3 4 2 3 3 4 2 1 3 4 2 2 3 4 1 4 4 3 1 4 4 3
Ld Ln 1 1 4 2 1 2 4 1 Ld Lo 1 3 4 2 1 3 4 1 Lo Ld 3 2 2 1 3 1 2 2
1 3 3 4 Dove-Hawk Endless 1 1 3 4 Biased Cycle Inferior 1 4 4 3 Alibi Inferior Cycle
1 1 4 1 Pd Nc Pd Sh 1 3 4 1 Pd Co Pd As 3 1 1 2 Co Pd Co Ch
Uneq.Exchange 1 3 3 4 1 3 3 4 Biased Focus 1 1 3 4 1 2 3 4 Biased Focus 2 4 4 3 2 4 4 3
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Threat Asym Dilemma Revelation Alibi Revelation Biased Cycle
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Tilted 3 4 4 2 3 4 4 1 Disadvantage 3 2 1 4 3 1 1 4 Disadvantage 3 4 4 1 3 4 4 2
1 3 2 1 1 3 2 2 2 1 4 3 2 2 4 3 1 2 2 3 1 1 2 3
MhMk:Jekyll-Hyde Dissonance






P5. C::H Pipe - Column Help
P7. D::C Pipe - Column FavorP3. D::D Pipe - Exchange P7. C::D Pipe - Row Favor
1~21~2
P3 D::D P7 D::C P7 C::D
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3. The topology of payoff swaps in 2x2 games 
 
Figure A3 displays the topology of 2x2 games (Robinson and Goforth 2005, Robinson et al. 
2007, Bruns 2015), which provides the framework for analysis in this paper. Symmetric 
games form a diagonal axis from lower left to upper right. Their payoffs combine to make 
asymmetric games. Making ties in payoff ranks simplifies games to form archetypes, breaking 
ties differentiates primal archetypes into the strict ordinal 2x2 games shown in the table.  
 
In the topology of 2x2 games, games linked by swaps in the two lowest-ranked outcomes are 
considered nearest neighbors. Four games linked by low swaps (1><2) form a tile, as on the 
right hand side of Figures A1 and A2. In Figure A3, an example is the tile with Assurance, 
Safe Choice, and the combinations of their payoff patterns. Middle swaps (2><3) create a 
neighboring game to start a new tile. Continuing this process until the payoff structures repeat 
creates a layer of nine tiles and thirty-six games. High swaps (3><4) start a new layer, for 
example when Stag Hunt turns into an Asymmetric Dilemma. Each layer forms a torus 
(doughnut) shape that can be “cut open” and displayed on a flat square. So, payoff swaps link 
games at the top of a layer to those at the bottom. Payoff swaps also link games from side-to-
side in a layer (like an early video game where a spaceship leaving one edge reappears on the 
other).  
 
Each actor could have payoff swaps for low, middle, or high payoffs (1><2, 2><3, 3><4). 
Therefore each game has six neighbors. Low and middle swap neighbors are shown in each 
layer, while high swaps transform into games on another layer. The topology of 2x2 games 
provides a map of the “adjacent possible” (Kauffman 1995) of potential transformations 
resulting from changes in the ranking of outcomes.  
 
The four layers in the topology of 2x2 games differ by the alignment of the best outcomes. In 
the discord layer (Layer 1) on the upper right of Figure A3, the best outcomes are in 
diagonally opposed cells. In the win-win layer (Layer 3) on the lower left, the best outcomes 
(4,4) are in the same cell. In Layers 2 and 4 the best outcomes are in the same row or column. 
Making ties for the three lowest payoffs simplifies all the games in a layer into one of the four 
basic archetypes: Win-Win for Layer 3, Discord for Layer 1, or Row or Column Threat (top 
outcomes in the same row or column) for Layers 2 and 4.  
 
As shown in Figure A1, some primal archetypes such as Primal Coordination and Primal 
Conflict ultimately generate eight strict ordinal games. These are arranged in two tiles that 
form a hotspot. In a hotspot, two tiles on different layers are linked by swaps in the two 
highest-ranked payoffs (3><4). Other primal archetypes, such as Primal Independence, Primal 
Exchange, and their neighbors generate sixteen strict ordinal games in four tiles, forming 
pipes, as shown in Figure A2. In a pipe, high swaps connect four tiles, one on each layer.  
 
Figure A3 locates the hotspots and pipes in the topology of 2x2 games. Hotspots can be 
identified by the layers they link. Thus the coordination hotspot links layers 1 and 3. The 
cyclic hotspot links layers 2 and 4. Pipes link tiles in equivalent locations on each of four 
layers. For example, high swaps link the Harmony tile to equivalently located tiles on the 
lower left of each layer (H::H pipe). Neighboring tiles above or to the right are similarly 
linked in quartets of tiles (C::H and H::C). The same applies for the tiles (D::D) on the upper 
right of each layer, and their neighboring tile quartets to the left and below (C::D, D::C). As 
shown in Figures A1 and A2, each hotspot or pipe simplifies into a primal archetype, an 
ancestor (progenitor) that differentiates into a family of games. 
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Figure A3. Hotspots and pipes in a “standard layout” of the topology of 2x2 games with 
Prisoner’s Dilemma in an outer corner. Figures A3b and A3c show how “scrolling” the 
display of the torus-shaped layer moves Prisoner’s Dilemma from an outer corner to an inner 




Pd Ha Ⅰ Pd Pc Pd Co Pd As Pd Sh Pd Nc Pd Dl Pd Cm Pd Hr Pd Ba Pd Ch Pd Pd
1 2 3 4 1 1 3 4 1 1 3 4 1 2 3 4 1 3 3 4 1 3 3 4 1 4 3 2 1 4 3 1 1 4 3 1 1 4 3 2 1 4 3 3 1 4 3 3
2 1 4 3 2 2 4 3 2 3 4 2 2 3 4 1 2 2 4 1 2 1 4 2 2 3 4 1 2 3 4 2 2 2 4 3 2 1 4 3 2 1 4 2 2 2 4 1
L3:L4 LdLh:Remediable D::C Alibi AsymD D::D Threat L1:L2 Sad D::C LdLb:Biased  Favor D::D Dilemma
Ch Ha Ch Pc Ch Co Ch As Ch Sh Ch Nc Ch Dl Ch Cm Ch Hr Ch Ba Ch Ch Ch Pd
2 2 3 4 2 1 3 4 2 1 3 4 2 2 3 4 2 3 3 4 2 3 3 4 2 4 3 2 2 4 3 1 2 4 3 1 2 4 3 2 2 4 3 3 2 4 3 3
1 1 4 3 1 2 4 3 1 3 4 2 1 3 4 1 1 2 4 1 1 1 4 2 1 3 4 1 1 3 4 2 1 2 4 3 1 1 4 3 1 1 4 2 1 2 4 1
SamaritanD Biased Type Biased Cycle Inferior Endless Dove-Hawk Bully Lopsided Caring Dilemma Chicken Called Bluff
Ba Ha Ba Pc Ba Co Ba As Ba Sh Ba Nc Ba Dl Ba Cm Ba Hr Ba Ba Ba Ch Ba Pd
3 2 2 4 3 1 2 4 3 1 2 4 3 2 2 4 3 3 2 4 3 3 2 4 3 4 2 2 3 4 2 1 3 4 2 1 3 4 2 2 3 4 2 3 3 4 2 3
1 1 4 3 1 2 4 3 1 3 4 2 1 3 4 1 1 2 4 1 1 1 4 2 1 3 4 1 1 3 4 2 1 2 4 3 1 1 4 3 1 1 4 2 1 2 4 1
C::H LbLh:Disadvantage L2:L4 LbAs:Clock ↻ C::D Samson C::H LbLk:Advantage L1:L3 Leader C::D LbLd:Biased Favor
Hr Ha Hr Pc Hr Co Hr As Hr Sh Hr Nc Hr Dl Hr Cm Hr Hr Hr Ba Hr Ch Hr Pd
3 2 1 4 3 1 1 4 3 1 1 4 3 2 1 4 3 3 1 4 3 3 1 4 3 4 1 2 3 4 1 1 3 4 1 1 3 4 1 2 3 4 1 3 3 4 1 3
2 1 4 3 2 2 4 3 2 3 4 2 2 3 4 1 2 2 4 1 2 1 4 2 2 3 4 1 2 3 4 2 2 2 4 3 2 1 4 3 2 1 4 2 2 2 4 1
Pursuit Zero-sum Crisis LbLn:Okay Focus Hero Quasi Battle
Cm Ha Cm Pc Cm Co Cm As Cm Sh Cm Nc Cm Dl CmCm Cm Hr Cm Ba Cm Ch Cm Pd
2 2 1 4 2 1 1 4 2 1 1 4 2 2 1 4 2 3 1 4 2 3 1 4 2 4 1 2 2 4 1 1 2 4 1 1 2 4 1 2 2 4 1 3 2 4 1 3
3 1 4 3 3 2 4 3 3 3 4 2 3 3 4 1 3 2 4 1 3 1 4 2 3 3 4 1 3 3 4 2 3 2 4 3 3 1 4 3 3 1 4 2 3 2 4 1
H::H LkLh:Tilted H::C LkAs:Good Enough L1:L4 LkLn:Yield H::H Compromise H::C LkLb:Advantage L1:L4 Sad
Dl Ha Dl Pc Dl Co Dl As Dl Sh Dl Nc Dl Dl Dl Cm Dl Hr Dl Ba Dl Ch Dl Pd
1 2 2 4 1 1 2 4 1 1 2 4 1 2 2 4 1 3 2 4 1 3 2 4 1 4 2 2 1 4 2 1 1 4 2 1 1 4 2 2 1 4 2 3 1 4 2 3
3 1 4 3 3 2 4 3 3 3 4 2 3 3 4 1 3 2 4 1 3 1 4 2 3 3 4 1 3 3 4 2 3 2 4 3 3 1 4 3 3 1 4 2 3 2 4 1
MkMh:Jekyll-Hyde Hamlet Grievance Deadlock Protector Bully Total Conflict
Nc Ha Nc Pc Nc Co Nc As Nc Sh Nc Nc Nc Dl Nc Cm Nc Hr Nc Ba Nc Ch Nc Pd
2 2 4 4 2 1 4 4 2 1 4 4 2 2 4 4 2 3 4 4 2 3 4 4 2 4 4 2 2 4 4 1 2 4 4 1 2 4 4 2 2 4 4 3 2 4 4 3
1 1 3 3 1 2 3 3 1 3 3 2 1 3 3 1 1 2 3 1 1 1 3 2 1 3 3 1 1 3 3 2 1 2 3 3 1 1 3 3 1 1 3 2 1 2 3 1
L3:L4 LnLh:Aid D::C LnLo:Best Favor Anticip.D::D Concord G L1:L2 LnLk:Yield D::C Samson D::D Threat
Sh Ha Sh Pc Sh Co Sh As Sh Sh Sh Nc Sh Dl Sh Cm Sh Hr Sh Ba Sh Ch Sh Pd
1 2 4 4 1 1 4 4 1 1 4 4 1 2 4 4 1 3 4 4 1 3 4 4 1 4 4 2 1 4 4 1 1 4 4 1 1 4 4 2 1 4 4 3 1 4 4 3
2 1 3 3 2 2 3 3 2 3 3 2 2 3 3 1 2 2 3 1 2 1 3 2 2 3 3 1 2 3 3 2 2 2 3 3 2 1 3 3 2 1 3 2 2 2 3 1
Charity MuMu:Trust Stag Hunt Anticipation Hamlet Big Bully Crisis Cycle Inspector Endless Asym Dilemma
As Ha As Pc As Co As As As Sh As Nc As Dl As Cm As Hr As Ba As Ch As Pd
1 2 4 4 1 1 4 4 1 1 4 4 1 2 4 4 1 3 4 4 1 3 4 4 1 4 4 2 1 4 4 1 1 4 4 1 1 4 4 2 1 4 4 3 1 4 4 3
3 1 2 3 3 2 2 3 3 3 2 2 3 3 2 1 3 2 2 1 3 1 2 2 3 3 2 1 3 3 2 2 3 2 2 3 3 1 2 3 3 1 2 2 3 2 2 1
C::H LoLh:Enable L1:L3 Assurance C::D LoLn:Best Favor C::H LoLk:Good Enough L2:L4 LoLb:Clock ↺    D::C Alibi
Co Ha Co Pc Co Co Co As Co Sh Co Nc Co Dl Co Cm Co Hr Co Ba Co Ch Co Pd
2 2 4 4 2 1 4 4 2 1 4 4 2 2 4 4 2 3 4 4 2 3 4 4 2 4 4 2 2 4 4 1 2 4 4 1 2 4 4 2 2 4 4 3 2 4 4 3
3 1 1 3 3 2 1 3 3 3 1 2 3 3 1 1 3 2 1 1 3 1 1 2 3 3 1 1 3 3 1 2 3 2 1 3 3 1 1 3 3 1 1 2 3 2 1 1
Safe Choice Pure Selection Pursuit Quasi Cyclic Biased Cycle Revelation
Pc Ha Pc Pc Pc Co Pc As Pc Sh Pc Nc Pc Dl Pc Cm Pc Hr Pc Ba Pc Ch Pc Pd
3 2 4 4 3 1 4 4 3 1 4 4 3 2 4 4 3 3 4 4 3 3 4 4 3 4 4 2 3 4 4 1 3 4 4 1 3 4 4 2 3 4 4 3 3 4 4 3
2 1 1 3 2 2 1 3 2 3 1 2 2 3 1 1 2 2 1 1 2 1 1 2 2 3 1 1 2 3 1 2 2 2 1 3 2 1 1 3 2 1 1 2 2 2 1 1
H::H Peace H::C LhLo:Enable L2:L3 Lhln:Aid H::H LhLk:Tilted H::C LhLb:Disadvantage] L2:L3 LhLd:Remediable
Ha Ha Ha Pc Ha Co Ha As Ha Sh Ha Nc Ha Dl Ha Cm Ha Hr Ha Ba Ha Ch Ha Pd
3 2 4 4 3 1 4 4 3 1 4 4 3 2 4 4 3 3 4 4 3 3 4 4 3 4 4 2 3 4 4 1 3 4 4 1 3 4 4 2 3 4 4 3 3 4 4 3
1 1 2 3 1 2 2 3 1 3 2 2 1 3 2 1 1 2 2 1 1 1 2 2 1 3 2 1 1 3 2 2 1 2 2 3 1 1 2 3 1 1 2 2 1 2 2 1
Harmony Donor MhMk:Jekyll-Hyde Dissonance Samaritan D Hegemony
b. Standard Layout - Pd in outer corner c. Dominant Strategy Layout - Pd in center
Ha Pc Co As Sh Nc Dl Cm Ha Ba Ch Pd
D Pd Prisoner's Dilemma Nc Ha Pc Co As Sh Pd Dl Cm Ha Ba Ch
Ch Chicken Chicken Ch  
Ba  Leader Leader Ba  
 Hr  Hero Hero  Hr  
H Cm  Compromise Compromise Cm  
Dl Deadlock Deadlock Dl
H D H D Prisoner's Dilemma Pd
 Nc D Concord
Sh Stag Hunt Stag Hunt Sh
As Assurance Assurance As
Co Safe Choice Safe Choice Co  
Pc  H Peace Peace Pc  
Ha  Harmony Harmony Ha  
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Figure A4 is a “dominant strategy” layout visualizing the topology of 2x2 games that 
elegantly displays many of the relationships between games (Robinson and Goforth 2005, 
Bruns 2015). Compared to Figure A3, the display in each layer “scrolls” to move Prisoner’s 
Dilemma to the inner corner, as shown in Figures A3b and A3c. In this layout, the quadrants 
within each layer differ by the alignment and number of dominant strategies. Games in the 
lower left quadrant of each layer have two dominant strategies. In the upper left and lower 
right quadrants, only one actor has a dominant strategy. If the other player can anticipate the 
dominant strategy, then their best move becomes clear. Games in these three quadrants all 
have a single equilibrium, resulting from dominant strategies for one or both actors. Games in 
the upper right quadrants have no dominant strategy. In pure (unmixed) strategies, they have 
either two equilibria, as in the coordination games, or no equilibrium, as in the cyclic games. 
Thus there are two quadrants of coordination games. In more colloquial terms, the diversity of 
2x2 games without dominant strategies includes a herd of risky stag hunts and a bunch of 
rivalrous battles, as well as two clumps of cyclic conflicts.  
 
In the dominant strategy layout, high swaps (3><4) link across layers so that at the center, 
Prisoner’s Dilemma turns into an Asymmetric Dilemma and then Stag Hunt. High swaps also 
link the entire table top-to-bottom and side-to-side. The high swap links in this layout help 
visualize many of the most interesting and important high swap transformations. These 
involve defection dilemmas and other descendants of Primal Exchange and Primal Favors. 
Asymmetric Dilemmas may turn into Endless conflicts and then into win-win games of 
Anticipation. Low swaps turn Prisoner’s Dilemma into lopsided results in Called Bluff and 
then the complex tensions of Chicken. High swaps convert Chicken into unbalanced 
brinksmanship in Dove-Hawk, which could then turn into resentful resistance in Threat or 
cooperation in Concord.  
 
High swap linkages can be visualized more generally in terms of horizontal (and vertical) 
bands of three tiles which link to equivalently located bands on other layers. The way in 
which the table wraps around from side-to-side and top-to-bottom already shows the linkages 
for the Dilemma (D) bands, since these tiles have been “split open” and form the borders of 
each layer. The other linkages require a bit more imagination to visualize.  
 
As an initial example, high swaps for the column player wrap around the table to transform 
Samaritan’s Dilemma (HaCh) into a Donor game (HaNc). This can model a conditional donor 
whose requirements reshape recipient behavior. High swaps for the row player convert 
Samaritan’s Dilemma into a Charity game (PcSh). This transformation could model a giver 
who becomes more sympathetic or more understanding and accepting of a recipient’s existing 
efforts and capabilities (Bruns 2010).  
 
More generally, the Harmony pipe in the lower left links tiles on four layers. The Harmony 
(H) bands slide horizontally for row swaps (and vertically for column swaps). High swaps for 
Row payoffs “slide” horizontally to the next layer and turn into the games above or below in 
the corresponding tile, as with the change from Samaritan’s Dilemma into Charity (HaCh >< 
PcSh). Similarly, column swaps slide vertically and link to the corresponding games to the 
left or right in the equivalently located tile. A series of four high swaps returns to the original 
tile and game. These links form the structure of the pipes shown in Figures A2 and A3. The 
pattern of high swap links can be summarized as “bands slide and switch,” as illustrated by 
the initial example of a high swap turning Samaritan’s Dilemma (HaCh)  into Charity (PcSh). 
Similarly, Bully (DlCh) becomes Big Bully (CmSh) through a high swap for the row actor.  
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Figure A4. A periodic table of elementary social situations, based on the topology of 2x2 
games. Dominant strategy layout of strict ordinal games above. Games with ties below.  
 
       
  
a. STRICT GAMES: Two-person, two-move (2x2) ordinal games with four payoff ranks, mapped in the Robinson-Goforth topology of 2x2 games. 
Symmetric games on diagonal axis, payoffs combine to make asymmetric games. Swaps in outcome ranks link neighboring games (1><2, 2><3, 3><4).
Ch Nc Ch Ha Ch Pc Ch Co Ch As Ch Sh Ch Pd Ch Dl Ch Cm Ch Hr Ch Ba Ch Ch
2 3 3 4 2 2 3 4 2 1 3 4 2 1 3 4 2 2 3 4 2 3 3 4 2 4 3 3 2 4 3 2 2 4 3 1 2 4 3 1 2 4 3 2 2 4 3 3
1 1 4 2 1 1 4 3 1 2 4 3 1 3 4 2 1 3 4 1 1 2 4 1 1 2 4 1 1 3 4 1 1 3 4 2 1 2 4 3 1 1 4 3 1 1 4 2
Dove-Hawk SamaritanD Biased Type Biased Cycle Inferior Endless Called Bluff Bully Lopsided CaringDilemma Chicken
Ba Nc Ba Ha Ba Pc Ba Co Ba As Ba Sh Ba Pd Ba Dl Ba Cm Ba Hr Ba Ba Ba Ch
3 3 2 4 3 2 2 4 3 1 2 4 3 1 2 4 3 2 2 4 3 3 2 4 3 4 2 3 3 4 2 2 3 4 2 1 3 4 2 1 3 4 2 2 3 4 2 3
1 1 4 2 1 1 4 3 1 2 4 3 1 3 4 2 1 3 4 1 1 2 4 1 1 2 4 1 1 3 4 1 1 3 4 2 1 2 4 3 1 1 4 3 1 1 4 2
Samson LbLh:Disadvantage Quasi Cyclic LbAs:Clock ↻ Inspector LbLd:Biased Favor Protector LbLk:Advantage LbLb:Rivalry Leader CaringDilemma
Hr Nc Hr Ha Hr Pc Hr Co Hr As Hr Sh Hr Pd Hr Dl Hr Cm Hr Hr Hr Ba Hr Ch
3 3 1 4 3 2 1 4 3 1 1 4 3 1 1 4 3 2 1 4 3 3 1 4 3 4 1 3 3 4 1 2 3 4 1 1 3 4 1 1 3 4 1 2 3 4 1 3
2 1 4 2 2 1 4 3 2 2 4 3 2 3 4 2 2 3 4 1 2 2 4 1 2 2 4 1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4 2 2 2 4 3 2 1 4 3 2 1 4 2
LbLn:Okay Focus Pursuit Zero-sum Crisis Hero Quasi Battle
Cm Nc Cm Ha Cm Pc Cm Co Cm As Cm Sh Cm Pd Cm Dl CmCm Cm Hr Cm Ba Cm Ch
2 3 1 4 2 2 1 4 2 1 1 4 2 1 1 4 2 2 1 4 2 3 1 4 2 4 1 3 2 4 1 2 2 4 1 1 2 4 1 1 2 4 1 2 2 4 1 3
3 1 4 2 3 1 4 3 3 2 4 3 3 3 4 2 3 3 4 1 3 2 4 1 3 2 4 1 3 3 4 1 3 3 4 2 3 2 4 3 3 1 4 3 3 1 4 2
LkLn:Yield Dissonance LkLh:Tilted LkAs:Good Enough Big Bully Sad LkLk:Second Best Compromise LkLb:Advantage Lopsided
Dl Nc Dl Ha Dl Pc Dl Co Dl As Dl Sh Dl Pd Dl Dl Dl Cm Dl Hr Dl Ba Dl Ch
1 3 2 4 1 2 2 4 1 1 2 4 1 1 2 4 1 2 2 4 1 3 2 4 1 4 2 3 1 4 2 2 1 4 2 1 1 4 2 1 1 4 2 2 1 4 2 3
3 1 4 2 3 1 4 3 3 2 4 3 3 3 4 2 3 3 4 1 3 2 4 1 3 2 4 1 3 3 4 1 3 3 4 2 3 2 4 3 3 1 4 3 3 1 4 2
Grievance MkMh:Jekyll-Hyde Hamlet Total Conflict Deadlock Protector Bully
Pd Nc Pd Ha Ⅰ Pd Pc Pd Co Pd As Pd Sh Pd Pd Pd Dl Pd Cm Pd Hr Pd Ba Pd Ch
1 3 3 4 1 2 3 4 1 1 3 4 1 1 3 4 1 2 3 4 1 3 3 4 1 4 3 3 1 4 3 2 1 4 3 1 1 4 3 1 1 4 3 2 1 4 3 3
2 1 4 2 2 1 4 3 2 2 4 3 2 3 4 2 2 3 4 1 2 2 4 1 2 2 4 1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4 2 2 2 4 3 2 1 4 3 2 1 4 2
Threat Hegemony LdLh:Remediable Revelation Alibi Asym Dilemma Dilemma Total Conflict Sad LdLb:Biased  Favor Called Bluff
Sh Nc Sh Ha Sh Pc Sh Co Sh As Sh Sh Sh Pd Sh Dl Sh Cm Sh Hr Sh Ba Sh Ch
1 3 4 4 1 2 4 4 1 1 4 4 1 1 4 4 1 2 4 4 1 3 4 4 1 4 4 3 1 4 4 2 1 4 4 1 1 4 4 1 1 4 4 2 1 4 4 3
2 1 3 2 2 1 3 3 2 2 3 3 2 3 3 2 2 3 3 1 2 2 3 1 2 2 3 1 2 3 3 1 2 3 3 2 2 2 3 3 2 1 3 3 2 1 3 2
Anticipation Charity MuMu:Trust Stag Hunt Asym Dilemma Hamlet Big Bully Crisis Cycle Inspector Endless
As Nc As Ha As Pc As Co As As As Sh As Pd As Dl As Cm As Hr As Ba As Ch
1 3 4 4 1 2 4 4 1 1 4 4 1 1 4 4 1 2 4 4 1 3 4 4 1 4 4 3 1 4 4 2 1 4 4 1 1 4 4 1 1 4 4 2 1 4 4 3
3 1 2 2 3 1 2 3 3 2 2 3 3 3 2 2 3 3 2 1 3 2 2 1 3 2 2 1 3 3 2 1 3 3 2 2 3 2 2 3 3 1 2 3 3 1 2 2
LoLn:Best Favor LoLh:Enable LoLo:Convention Assurance MuMu:Trust Alibi LoLk:Good Enough Zero-sum LoLb:Clock ↺   Inferior Cycle
Co Nc Co Ha Co Pc Co Co Co As Co Sh Co Pd Co Dl Co Cm Co Hr Co Ba Co Ch
2 3 4 4 2 2 4 4 2 1 4 4 2 1 4 4 2 2 4 4 2 3 4 4 2 4 4 3 2 4 4 2 2 4 4 1 2 4 4 1 2 4 4 2 2 4 4 3
3 1 1 2 3 1 1 3 3 2 1 3 3 3 1 2 3 3 1 1 3 2 1 1 3 2 1 1 3 3 1 1 3 3 1 2 3 2 1 3 3 1 1 3 3 1 1 2
Safe Choice Pure Selection Revelation Pursuit Quasi Cyclic Biased Cycle
Pc Nc Pc Ha Pc Pc Pc Co Pc As Pc Sh Pc Pd Pc Dl Pc Cm Pc Hr Pc Ba Pc Ch
3 3 4 4 3 2 4 4 3 1 4 4 3 1 4 4 3 2 4 4 3 3 4 4 3 4 4 3 3 4 4 2 3 4 4 1 3 4 4 1 3 4 4 2 3 4 4 3
2 1 1 2 2 1 1 3 2 2 1 3 2 3 1 2 2 3 1 1 2 2 1 1 2 2 1 1 2 3 1 1 2 3 1 2 2 2 1 3 2 1 1 3 2 1 1 2
Lhln:Aid LhLh:Synergy Peace LhLo:Enable Charity LhLd:Remediable LhLk:Tilted LhLb:Disadvantage] Biased Type
Ha Nc Ha Ha Ha Pc Ha Co Ha As Ha Sh Ha Pd Ha Dl Ha Cm Ha Hr Ha Ba Ha Ch
3 3 4 4 3 2 4 4 3 1 4 4 3 1 4 4 3 2 4 4 3 3 4 4 3 4 4 3 3 4 4 2 3 4 4 1 3 4 4 1 3 4 4 2 3 4 4 3
1 1 2 2 1 1 2 3 1 2 2 3 1 3 2 2 1 3 2 1 1 2 2 1 1 2 2 1 1 3 2 1 1 3 2 2 1 2 2 3 1 1 2 3 1 1 2 2
Donor Harmony Hegemony MhMk:Jekyll-Hyde Dissonance Samaritan D
Nc Nc Nc Ha Nc Pc Nc Co Nc As Nc Sh Nc Pd Nc Dl Nc Cm Nc Hr Nc Ba Nc Ch
2 3 4 4 2 2 4 4 2 1 4 4 2 1 4 4 2 2 4 4 2 3 4 4 2 4 4 3 2 4 4 2 2 4 4 1 2 4 4 1 2 4 4 2 2 4 4 3
1 1 3 2 1 1 3 3 1 2 3 3 1 3 3 2 1 3 3 1 1 2 3 1 1 2 3 1 1 3 3 1 1 3 3 2 1 2 3 3 1 1 3 3 1 1 3 2
Concord Donor LnLh:Aid LnLo:Best Favor Anticipation Threat Grievance LnLk:Yield LnLb:Okay Focus Samson Dove-Hawk
 Left Right Layers Dominant Strategies         High Swaps (3><4) Link Layers
 Payoffs Column Discord
Row  Column L4 4 4 L1 L4 1 0 1 0 L1
4 4 2 1 2 1
4,4 4 4 1 0 1 0
L3 L2 L3 2 1 2 1 L2
Win-win Row
b. EDGE GAMES: Symmetric ordinal games with three payoff ranks and equal ranks (ties) for two outcomes. Low, middle, or high ties games lie between strict games.
Low swaps (1><2) link four strict games in a tile. Low ties (1~2 half swaps) make a game at the center of the tile. High ties (3~4) simplify into primal archetypes. 
Sh Ln Ln Nc Nc Mh Mh Ha Ha Lh Lh Pc Pc Mp Mp Co Co Lo Lo As As Mu Mu Sh Ch Ld Ld Pd Pd Mk Mk Dl Dl Lk Lk Cm Cm Mm Mm Hr Hr Lb Lb Ba Ba Mb Mb Ch
1 3 4 4 3 3 4 4 3 1 4 4 3 1 4 4 1 1 4 4 1 3 4 4 1 4 3 3 -1 +1 0 0 1 4 1 1 3 4 1 1 3 4 1 1 3 4 3 3
1 1 3 1 1 1 3 3 1 1 1 3 3 3 1 3 3 3 1 1 3 3 3 1 1 1 4 1 0 0 +1 -1 3 3 4 1 3 3 4 3 1 1 4 3 1 1 4 3
Offer Invisible Hand Synergy Security Convention Trust D Defection D Crux 2nd Best Middle Way Rivalry Volunteer D
Nc Hn Hn Ch Ha Hh Hh Cm Pc Hp Hp Dl Co Ho Ho As Co Ho1 Ho1 As Sh Hu Hu Pd Pd Hu Hu Sh Dl Hp1 Hp1 Pc Cm Hh1 Hh1 Ha Hr He He Ba Ba He1 He1 Hr Ch Hn Hn Nc
3 4 4 4 4 3 4 4 4 1 4 4 3 1 4 4 1 3 4 4 1 4 4 4 1 4 4 4 1 4 3 3 3 4 1 1 4 4 1 1 4 4 3 3 3 4 4 4
1 1 4 3 1 1 3 4 3 3 1 4 4 4 1 3 4 4 3 1 3 3 4 1 3 3 4 1 4 4 4 1 4 4 4 3 3 3 4 4 1 1 4 4 1 1 4 3
Nurture Liberty Club Caution Caution Cusp D Cusp D Club Liberty Quandary Quandary Nurture
c. VERTEX GAMES PRIMAL Du Du Du Dh1 Du Do1
2 likes, 2 dislikes 1 4 4 4 1 4 4 1 1 4 4 1
LAYER SAFE 1 1 4 1 1 4 4 1 1 1 4 4
Basic: 1 like, 3 dislikes Maximin: 1 dislike, 3 likes Exchange Win-Lose Favors
Bd Bh Bd Bd Tk Th Tk Tk Do Do Do Du DoDh1 DoDo1
1 1 1 4 1 4 1 1 4 4 4 4 4 1 4 4 1 1 4 4 1 4 4 4 1 4 4 1 1 4 4 1
ORIGIN 1 1 4 1 1 1 4 1 4 1 1 4 4 4 1 4 4 4 1 1 4 1 1 1 4 4 1 1 4 1 1 4
Zero Basic Threat Discord Safe Side Favors Help Conflict
Ze Ze Bh Bh Bh Bd Th Th Th Tk Dh Dh Dh Do Dh Du DhDh1 DhDo1
0 0 0 0 1 1 4 4 1 4 4 1 4 4 4 4 4 1 4 4 4 1 4 4 4 1 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 1 4 4 4 1
0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 4 4 1 4 4 4 1 1 1 4 1 4 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 4 1 1 1 1 1 4
Avoidance Safe Side Help Gift Independence Help
Bruns & Kim
m
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A high swap transforms Safe Choice or Assurance into an asymmetric game combining 
payoffs from Leader and Hero. High swaps link the two tiles to form a hotspot. The cyclic 
tiles on Layers 2 and 4 are similarly linked diagonally. Thus, the Central (C, as in 
coordination and cyclic) bands criss-cross diagonally. This linkage provides useful landmarks 
for visualizing high swaps. Other games in these bands similarly “slide and switch.” Within 
each tile, row swaps again turn into games above or below on the linked tile. Column swaps 
turn into games on the left or right. Thus a column swap for Protector (DlBa) slides 
diagonally and turns into a win-win game (HaCo). One player still has a dominant strategy, 
but now the other player can also get their best outcome. A row swap for the other version of 
Protector (BaDl), correspondingly turns into CoHa.  
 
Another way to think about the high swap links is to remember that high swaps for both Row 
and Column turn Compromise into Harmony and Deadlock into Peace. Other games in the 
same row or column follow the same pattern. A swap only for Row would slide horizontally 
and switch rows to link to the equivalently located tile on Layer 2, while a swap for Column 
would slide vertically and switch columns to link to the equivalently located tile on Layer 4. 
The combination of these linkages joins the four tiles into the Harmony pipe. Hotspots 
similarly link two layers, as in the cyclic hotspot connecting Layer 2 and Layer 4.  
 
Visualization of payoffs at equilibrium in the topology of 2x2 games shows broad regions of 
better and worse outcomes that differ in their stability in response to changes in preferences 
(Bruns 2015). Analysis of how archetypal games generate strict games further illustrates these 
broad differences in results and robustness with half the archetypes generating hotspots and 
pipes of games with good results (best or second-best, shown in green, blue, and yellow)  and 
the other half of the families usually yielding poor results for at least one actor. Families of 
primal archetypes as well as high swap linkages show how the landscape of 2x2 games 
depicted in the dominant strategy layout consists of “highland plateaus of stability” with 
relatively good outcomes at equilibrium which are bordered by “chaotic terrain” with poor 
results for one or both. More colloquially, these could be called “nice” games with good 
outcomes and “nasty” games that generate inequality. In the precipitous region of unequal 
equilibrium outcomes, game structures and outcomes are sensitively dependent on changes in 
the ranking of outcomes. This includes the risk of getting stuck in a canyon, trapped in a 
deeply unsatisfactory situation where both get second-worst results. Those trying to navigate 
such institutional landscapes face diverse challenges of miscoordination, instability, 
inequality and inefficiency.  
 
4. Ties make games between 
 
Games with ties lie “between” the strict ordinal games, linked by “half-swaps” that make or 
break ties (Robinson et al. 2007, Heilig 2012, Hopkins 2014, Bruns 2015). Figure A5a shows 
a tile of games linked by low swaps (1><2) for Assurance, Safe Choice, and the games that 
combine their payoffs (CoAs and AsCo). Figure A5b shows an expanded tile with games 
created by the half-swaps that make (or break) ties (1~2). The games with ties lie between the 
four strict games, with Convention (LoLo) as an intermediate archetype in the center of the 
tile.  
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Figure A5. Tiles of games. a. Swaps in lowest payoffs (1><2) link four games to make a tile. 
b. Expanded tile shows games with ties between strict games (1~2). Making low ties 
simplifies all the games in a tile into a single game with low ties, such as Convention (LoLo).  
 
    
 
The strict ordinal games can be visualized as located in the center of each game shown in the 
table in Figure A4.  Grid lines mark the boundaries between different ordinal games. Games 
with low ties or middle ties for both actors then lie at the intersection of grid lines. 
 
The middle of Figure A4 shows all the symmetric ordinal games with ties, including low 
(1~2), middle (2~3), and high (3~4) ties. The games with low and middle ties can be 
visualized as lying along the diagonal axis of the topology of 2x2 games, located between the 
strict ordinal games. This is shown by the abbreviations in the upper corners of the cell 
displaying payoffs for each game with ties. Figures A3 and A4 also show names for low ties 
games at the center of tiles, preceded by abbreviations.  
 
The bottom of Figure A4 also shows the simplest archetypes with only two payoff ranks, likes 
and dislikes. This includes the primal archetypes discussed above, with ties for the two 
highest and two lowest-ranked outcomes. The Layer (or Basic) games have a single like, and 
ties for the three lowest-ranked outcomes. Similarly, there are games with a single dislike, and 
indifference between the higher-ranked outcomes (triple ties for the highest rank). Such Safe 
or “dislike” games may be useful in thinking about situations where actors emphasize caution 
and risk avoidance. In three out of the four possible dislike games, action by one to avoid risk 
is sufficient to ensure that both avoid the worst outcome and get to win-win. However, in the 
fourth possibility, with dislikes in diagonally opposed cells, both need to avoid risk to reach 
the Safe Cell (or else somehow coordinate on the alternative risky win-win outcome). The 
Safe games are relatively easy to solve and do not seem to have received much attention in 
analyzing collective action. Therefore, they are not proposed as archetypes in this analysis.  
 
Figure A6 shows ordinal games with middle or low ties. This includes Advantage (LkLb) and 
Jekyll-Hyde (MhMk), which were discussed earlier, as well as other games that could be 
considered as intermediate archetypes or which might offer useful models for analysis. As 
mentioned above, symmetric games on the diagonal lie between the strict symmetric ordinal 
games. Asymmetric games of possible interest include Unequal Exchange (LnLd) where 
balanced exchange has become asymmetric and delivers unequal results at equilibrium, and 
Brave Altruist (MkMm) as a possible model of cheap but risky kindness. The unequal 
equilibrium outcome in the Remediable game (LhLd) (and the four strict games on the tile it 
forms) might be addressed in multiple ways: by taking turns, based on the threat by the 
disadvantaged actor; or transformed into a win-win game by high swaps for either Row or 
As Co As Lo As As
b. 1 1 4 4 1 1 4 4 1 2 4 4
3 3 2 2 3 3 2 1 3 3 2 1
As Co As As Pure Selection Assurance
a. 1 1 4 4 1 2 4 4
3 3 2 2 3 3 2 1 Lo Co Lo Lo Lo As
LoLo:Convention Assurance 1 1 4 4 1 1 4 4 1 2 4 4
Co Co Co As 3 3 1 2 3 3 1 1 3 3 1 1
2 1 4 4 2 2 4 4 Convention
3 3 1 2 3 3 1 1
Safe Choice Pure Selection Co Co Co Lo Co As
2 1 4 4 2 1 4 4 2 2 4 4
3 3 1 2 3 3 1 1 3 3 1 1
Safe Choice Pure Selection
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Column. However, the tiles for the Tilted and Disadvantage game are not as easy to improve, 
with the only transformative solution being a high swap for the disadvantaged player.  
 
The middle ties Crux game (MkMk) is located between Prisoner’s Dilemma and Deadlock 
and is unique in being the only symmetric zero-sum game (zero-rank sum for ordinal 
payoffs). Therefore, in Figures A4 and A6 and elsewhere it is shown with payoff values of 
+1,0,–1. Crux lies at the intersection of the axis of symmetric games and the axis of conflict 
games that includes the zero-sum games of Total Conflict (PdDl/DlPd), Big Bully 
(ShCm/CmSh), and Zero-sum Cycle (AsHr/HrAs).  
 
The names suggested in Figure A6 and elsewhere are intended as heuristic and exploratory. 
More generally, names for payoff structures can invoke metaphors and stories for which the 
games may provide relevant models. The abbreviations in the 2x2 game identifiers provide a 
systematic nomenclature for identifying payoff structures and their relative locations, which 
can coexist with multiple and evolving common names and stories.   
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Figure A6. Ordinal games with low and middle ties. Symmetric games are on the diagonal 
axis. Their payoffs combine to form asymmetric games.  
   
 
  
Atlas of 2x2 Games
Ba Mb Mb Ch
3 4 3 3
1 1 4 3 Mb
Volunteer D
Cm Mm Mm Hr Mn Mb
MIDDLE TIES 3 4 1 1 3 4 1 3
3 3 4 3 3 1 4 3 Mm
Middle Way
Pd Mk Mk Dl MkMm Mk Mb
-1 +1 0 0 1 4 3 1 1 4 3 3
0 0 +1 -1 3 3 4 3 3 1 4 3 Mk
Crux Brave Altruist
As Mu Mu Sh Mu Mk MuMm Mu Mb
1 3 4 4 1 4 4 3 1 4 4 1 1 4 4 3
3 3 3 1 3 3 3 1 3 3 3 3 3 1 3 3 Mu
Trust D Mid Cycle
Pc Mp Mp Co Mp Mu Mp Mk MpMm Mp Mb
3 1 4 4 3 3 4 4 3 4 4 3 3 4 4 1 3 4 4 3
3 3 1 3 3 3 1 1 3 3 1 1 3 3 1 3 3 1 1 3 Mp
Security
Nc Mh Mh Ha Mh Mp Mh Mu Mh Mk MhMm Mh Mb
3 3 4 4 3 1 4 4 3 3 4 4 3 4 4 3 3 4 4 1 3 4 4 3
1 1 3 3 1 3 3 3 1 3 3 1 1 3 3 1 1 3 3 3 1 1 3 3 Mh
Invisible Hand Jekyll-Hyde
Ch Ld Ld Pd Ld Mh Ld Mp Ld Mu Ld Mk Ld Mm Ld Mb
1 4 3 3 1 3 3 4 1 1 3 4 1 3 3 4 1 4 3 3 1 4 3 1 1 4 3 3
1 1 4 1 1 1 4 3 1 3 4 3 1 3 4 1 1 3 4 1 1 3 4 3 1 1 4 3 Ld
Defection D
Hr Lb Lb Ba Lb Ld Lb Mh Lb Mp Lb Mu Lb Mk Lb Mm Lb Mb
3 4 1 1 3 4 1 3 3 3 1 4 3 1 1 4 3 3 1 4 3 4 1 3 3 4 1 1 3 4 1 3
1 1 4 3 1 1 4 1 1 1 4 3 1 3 4 3 1 3 4 1 1 3 4 1 1 3 4 3 1 1 4 3 Lb
Rivalry Biased Favor
Dl Lk Lk Cm Lk Lb Lk Ld Lk Mh Lk Mp Lk Mu Lk Mk Lk Mm Lk Mb
LOW TIES 1 4 1 1 1 4 1 1 1 4 1 3 1 3 1 4 1 1 1 4 1 3 1 4 1 4 1 3 1 4 1 1 1 4 1 3
3 3 4 1 3 1 4 3 3 1 4 1 3 1 4 3 3 3 4 3 3 3 4 1 3 3 4 1 3 3 4 3 3 1 4 3 Lk
2nd Best Advantage Resist
Sh Ln Ln Nc Ln Lk Ln Lb Ln Ld Ln Mh Ln Mp Ln Mu Ln Mk Ln Mm Ln Mb
1 3 4 4 1 4 4 1 1 4 4 1 1 4 4 3 1 3 4 4 1 1 4 4 1 3 4 4 1 4 4 3 1 4 4 1 1 4 4 3
1 1 3 1 1 3 3 1 1 1 3 3 1 1 3 1 1 1 3 3 1 3 3 3 1 3 3 1 1 3 3 1 1 3 3 3 1 1 3 3 Ln
Offer Yield Okay Focus Uneq.Exchange  Posthegemony
Co Lo Lo As Lo Ln Lo Lk Lo Lb Lo Ld Lo Mh Lo Mp Lo Mu Lo Mk Lo Mm Lo Mb
1 1 4 4 1 3 4 4 1 4 4 1 1 4 4 1 1 4 4 3 1 3 4 4 1 1 4 4 1 3 4 4 1 4 4 3 1 4 4 1 1 4 4 3
3 3 1 1 3 1 1 1 3 3 1 1 3 1 1 3 3 1 1 2 3 1 1 3 3 3 1 3 3 3 1 1 3 3 1 1 3 3 1 3 3 1 1 3 Lo
Convention Best Favor Good EnoughCounterclock Biased Focus
Ha Lh Lh Pc Lh Lo Lh Ln Lh Lk Lh Lb Lh Ld Lh Mh Lh Mp Lh Mu Lh Mk Lh Mm Lh Mb
3 1 4 4 3 1 4 4 3 3 4 4 3 4 4 1 3 4 4 1 3 4 4 3 3 3 4 4 3 1 4 4 3 3 4 4 3 4 4 3 3 4 4 1 3 4 4 3
1 1 1 3 1 3 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 3 1 1 1 1 1 3 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 3 1 3 1 3 1 3 1 1 1 3 1 1 1 3 1 3 1 1 1 3 Lh
Synergy Enable Cure Tilted DisadvantageRemediable
Lh Lo Ln Lk Lb Ld Mh Mp Mu Mk Mm Mb
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5. Primal archetypes and their variants 
 
Figure 2 shows primal archetypes, omitting many variants that are equivalent by 
interchanging rows or columns or switching positions of Row and Column actors. Figure A7 
shows the corresponding full set of primal archetypes and variants derived by simplifying the 
games in the topology of 2x2 games displayed in Figure A3. As in the display of the strict 
topology of 2x2 games, symmetric games form a diagonal axis from lower left to upper right. 
Payoff patterns from symmetric games combine to form asymmetric games. Games on either 
side of the axis are equivalent by switching positions for Row and Column. Primal Conflict 
on Layer 2 cycles counterclockwise while its chiral reflection on Layer 4 cycles clockwise. 
 
Starting from the topology of strict ordinal 2x2 games shown in Figure A3, making ties for 
the two lowest-ranked payoffs simplifies each tile into a single game. This reduces the 12 by 
12 matrix of games to 6 by 6. Making further ties for the two highest-ranked payoffs creates 
primal games as shown in Figure A7. Variants appear at equivalent locations on each layer. 
This follows the structure of hotspots and pipes discussed above and shown in Figure A3. 
Hotspots are identified according to the layers they link. Pipes are identified by their location 
in vertical and horizontal bands of tiles: harmony pipes (H::H, C::H, H::C) are on the lower 
left and dilemma pipes (D::D, C::D, D::C) are on the upper right.  
 
The three symmetric primal archetypes appear on Layer 3 on the lower left. A variant of 
Primal Independence with rows and columns interchanged is on Layer 1, along with a variant 
of Primal Coordination with interchanged rows (or with interchanged columns creating the 
same result). Starting from Figure A3, simplified payoffs from Harmony and Peace are 
equivalent to those from Deadlock and Compromise by interchanging rows and columns. 
Simplified payoffs from Safe Choice and Assurance are equivalent to those from Hero and 
Leader by interchanging rows or columns. Payoffs simplified from Prisoner’s Dilemma and 
Chicken end up identical to those from Concord and Stag Hunt since the convention to orient 
payoffs with Row’s 4 right and Column’s 4 up creates a unique (or indistinguishable) 
orientation rather than allowing two interchanged variants.   
 
The primal archetypes in these pipes and hotspots illustrate many of the basic solution 
concepts in game theory.  
 
• In the harmony pipes dominant strategies lead to win-win equilibria, for Primal 
Independence and, with anticipation by one actor, in the neighboring pair of 
asymmetric variants of Primal Help.  
• Primal Gift and Primal Win-Lose also have dominant strategies, leading respectively 
to win-win or win-lose.  
• Primal Coordination poses a problem of equilibrium selection, including the Layer 1 
variant where the two alternative equilibria are aligned on the diagonal from lower 
right to upper left.  
• Primal Conflict is a zero-sum game. For repeated interaction, a mixed strategy offers 
an equilibrium solution, randomly choosing each move half the time. 
• In the dilemma pipes, the archetypal games of Primal Exchange and Primal Favors do 
not have dominant strategies. Therefore focal points or other solution concepts are 
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Figure A7. Primal archetypes with variants that interchange rows and columns or positions. 
These are formed by making ties in the topology of strict 2x2 games for the two highest-
ranked and two lowest-ranked outcomes. Each tile of four games in Figure A3 collapses into a 
single game. Symmetric games still form an axis of symmetry from lower left to upper right. 
Games on either side of the axis are still equivalent by switching positions as Row or Column. 
Equivalently-located tiles form hotspots linking two layers or pipes linking four layers.  
 
    
  
  
Dh Do Du Dh1 Do1 Du1
L4 L1
Du1  Du1 Dh Du1 Do Du1 Du  Du1 Dh1  Du1Do1  Du1Du1
1 1 4 4 1 1 4 4 1 4 4 4 1 4 4 1 1 4 4 1 1 4 4 4
1 1 4 4 1 4 4 1 1 1 4 1 D 1 4 4 1 1 1 4 4 1 1 4 1
 Gift  Favors  Exchange  Win-Lose  Favors  Exchange
Do1  Do1 Dh Do1 Do Do1 Du Do1 Dh1  Do1 Do1 Do1Du1
4 1 1 4 4 1 1 4 4 4 1 4 4 4 1 1 4 4 1 1 4 4 1 4
1 1 4 4 1 4 4 1 1 1 4 1 C 1 4 4 1 1 1 4 4 1 1 4 1
 Help  Conflict ↻  Favors  Help Coordination  Favors
Dh1 Dh1 Dh Dh1 Do Dh1 Du Dh1 Dh1  Dh1 Do1 Dh1Dh1  
1 1 1 4 1 1 1 4 1 4 1 4 1 4 1 1 1 4 1 1 1 4 1 4
4 1 4 4 4 4 4 1 4 1 4 1 H 4 4 4 1 4 1 4 4 4 1 4 1
Independence  Help  Win-Lose Independence  Help Win-Lose
Du Du Dh Du Do Du Du Du Dh1 Du Do1 DuDu1
1 1 4 4 1 1 4 4 1 4 4 4 1 4 4 1 1 4 4 1 1 4 4 4
1 1 4 4 1 4 4 1 1 1 4 1 1 4 4 1 1 1 4 4 1 1 4 1
 Gift  Favors Exchange  Win-Lose  Favors  Exchange
Do Do Dh Do Do Do Du DoDh1 DoDo1 DoDu1
1 1 4 4 1 1 4 4 1 4 4 4 1 4 4 1 1 4 4 1 1 4 4 4
4 1 1 4 4 4 1 1 4 1 1 1 4 4 1 1 4 1 1 4 4 1 1 1
 Help Coordination  Favors  Help  Conflict ↺  Favors
Dh Dh Dh Dh Do Dh Du DhDh1 DhDo1 DhDo1
4 1 4 4 4 1 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 1 4 4 4 1 4 4 4 4
1 1 1 4 1 4 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 4 1 1 1 1 1 4 1 1 1 1
   Help  Gift Independence  Help Gift
L3  Double Double Double Double Double Double L2
Harmony Coordination Hunt Compromise Rivalry Dilemma
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6. A map of symmetric 2x2 games with ties 
 
Figure 3 showed how the three symmetric primal archetypes differentiate to form twelve strict 
symmetric games. Figure A8 offers an alternative and more systematic view of the 
relationships among symmetric games, including those with two high ties or two middle ties 
for each actor. The combinations of ordinal payoffs in 2x2 games and the ways in which 
payoff swaps change one game into another can be visualized on the sides of a cube (Huertas-
Rosero 2003, Goforth and Robinson 2012). Slicing the cube diagonally, games on two sides 
are equivalent by interchanging rows and columns (or algebraically by switching the 
“temptation” and “sucker” payoffs in a Prisoner’s Dilemma). So, only twelve games are 
needed to show the relationships. The visualization shows half of a box (disdyakis cube) cut 
on the diagonal and unfolded. The other half of the box would have another set of the same 
games.  
 
The three primal archetypes lie at the center of sides of the box (faces of a cube). Breaking 
ties generates neighboring games. Breaking either high ties or low ties generates neighbors on 
the diagonal. Breaking both pairs of ties generates horizontal or vertical neighbors, strict 
games above or below or left or right of the primal archetypes.  
 
Overall, descendants of Independence and their neighbors form part of a large region of stable 
games with win-win or second-best outcomes, shown in yellow and green. Descendants of 
Primal Exchange are diverse: many turn into coordination problems of trust or rivalry, some 
become concordant win-win games and a few are particularly interesting and challenging for 
collective action, notably Prisoner's Dilemma, Chicken, and Stag Hunt.  
 
Rivalry games are on top of the box, and trust games on the bottom, with Primal Coordination 
like a "wormhole" that links the two types of coordination games (Goforth and Robinson 
2012). Middle ties games, such as Volunteer's Dilemma and Trust Dilemma (Rousseau's 
Hunt) are on edges between sides of the box. This figure can also be folded back on itself to 
provide a simple way to visualize the relationships between the twelve strict symmetric 2x2 
games and their neighbors formed by half-swaps to make ties.  
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Figure A8. Topology of symmetric 2x2 games with ties. The simplest Basic and Safe 
symmetric games with three ties and one like or dislike form the corners of a box (disdyakis 
cube). Independence and Exchange are each in the center of sides of the box, surrounded by 
their descendants created by symmetrically breaking ties. Coordination games form triangular 




7. Prevalence of bias games 
 
Figure A9 shows a schematic visualization of the topology of 2x2 games displaying the bias 
games, also called suasion (Martin 1992) or rambo games (Zürn 1993, Hasenclever et al. 
1997, Holzinger 2003), where dominant strategies lead to unequal payoffs at a single 
equilibrium. This shows the proportions in the payoff space of possible 2x2 games. The 
proportions of games in the topology of 2x2 games are also those that would be  expected if 
payoffs are generated randomly (Simpson 2010, Bruns 2015). Out of 144 games, 66 games 
(46%) are bias games, with a single equilibrium that has unequal payoffs. Nine more 
symmetric games have two equilibria that both have unequal payoffs, for a total of 75 games 
(52%). By comparison, 51 games (35%) have equal payoffs at equilibrium, most of which are 
 Do Do Do Do
1 1 4 4 1 1 4 4
4 4 1 1 4 4 1 1
  
Hr Lb Lb Ba Ba Ba Hr He He Ba Hr He He Ba Hr Hr Hr Lb Lb Ba
3 4 1 1 3 4 2 2 4 4 1 1 4 4 1 1 3 4 1 1 3 4 1 1
1 1 4 3 1 1 4 3 3 3 4 4 3 3 4 4 2 2 4 3 1 1 4 3
Rivalry Leader Quandary Quandary Hero Rivalry
 Bd Bd Ba MbMb Ch  Th Th Cm Mm Mm Hr  Bd Bd
1 4 1 1 3 4 3 3 4 4 4 4 3 4 1 1 1 4 1 1
1 1 4 1 1 1 4 3 1 1 4 4 3 3 4 3 1 1 4 1
Discord Volunteer D Avoidance Middle Way Discord
Ch Ld Ld Pd Ch Ch Nc Hn Hn Ch Ha Hh Hh Cm CmCm Dl Lk Lk Cm
1 4 3 3 2 4 3 3 3 4 4 4 4 3 4 4 2 4 1 1 1 4 1 1
1 1 4 1 1 1 4 2 1 1 4 3 1 1 3 4 3 3 4 2 3 3 4 1
Defection D Chicken Nurture Liberty Compromise 2nd Best
Pd MkMk Dl Pd Pd Du Du Nc Nc Nc MhMh Ha Ha Ha Dh Dh Dl Dl Pd MkMk Dl
-1 +1 0 0 1 4 3 3 1 4 4 4 2 3 4 4 3 3 4 4 3 2 4 4 4 1 4 4 1 4 2 2 -1 +1 0 0
0 0 +1 -1 2 2 4 1 1 1 4 1 1 1 3 2 1 1 3 3 1 1 2 3 1 1 1 4 3 3 4 1 0 0 +1 -1
Crux Dilemma Exchange Concord InvisibleHand Harmony Deadlock Crux
Sh Hu Hu Pd Sh Sh Sh Ln Ln Nc Ha Lh Lh Pc Pc Pc Pc Hp Hp Dl
1 4 4 4 1 3 4 4 1 3 4 4 3 1 4 4 3 1 4 4 4 1 4 4
3 3 4 1 2 2 3 1 1 1 3 1 1 1 1 3 2 2 1 3 3 3 1 4
Cusp D Stag Hunt Offer Synergy Peace Club
 Tk Tk As MuMu Sh  Bh Bh Pc MpMp Co Tk Tk
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4 4 1 4 3 3 3 1 1 1 1 1 3 3 1 3 4 4 1 4
Trust D Security
Co Ho Ho As As As Co Lo Lo As Co Lo Lo As Co Co Co Ho Ho As
3 1 4 4 1 2 4 4 1 1 4 4 1 1 4 4 2 1 4 4 3 1 4 4
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win-win (4,4). That includes 4 stag hunts (3%) that have equal payoffs at the Pareto-superior 
equilibrium and unequal payoffs at the inferior equilibrium. The remaining 18 games (12.5%) 
are cyclic, with no equilibrium. In summary, just over a third of games have equal payoffs at 
equilibrium, while slightly over half have unequal payoffs at equilibrium (and the remaining 
eighth of games are cyclic, with no equilibrium in pure strategies). 
 
The inefficiency problems of Prisoner’s Dilemma and Stag Hunt/Assurance problems have 
received most attention in game theory research. However, only 16 games (11%) have Pareto-
inferior equilibria, 9 stag hunts and 7 dilemmas. That includes four dilemmas with unequal 
payoffs at equilibrium that are also bias games. Overall, in the payoff space of possible 
games, inequality problems are much more prevalent than efficiency problems.  
 
It should be noted that the term “bias games” here concerns structural bias in incentives and 
equilibrium outcomes. This differs from usage of the term “biased games” by Caragiannis, 
Kurokawa, and Procaccia (2014) in their analysis of strategic bias in the selection of mixed 
strategies visible to the other actor in repeated interaction.  
 




4,2 4,3 4,3 ↻ ↻ ↻ 2,4 2,4 2,4 / / / Ch
4,2 4,3 4,3 ↻ ↻ ↻ 3,4 3,4 3,4 / / / Ba
4,2 4,3 4,3 ↻ ↻ ↻ 3,4 3,4 3,4 / / / Hr
4,2 4,3 4,3 3,3 3,3 3,2 3,2 3,3 3,3 3,4 3,4 4,2 Cm
4,2 4,3 4,3 3,3 3,3 3,2 3,2 3,3 3,3 3,4 3,4 4,2 Dl
4,2 4,3 4,3 2,3 2,3 2,2 2,2 2,3 2,3 3,4 3,4 4,2 Pd
4,4 4,4 4,4 \ \ \ 2,2 2,3 2,3 ↺ ↺ ↺ Sh
4,4 4,4 4,4 \ \ \ 3,2 3,3 3,3 ↺ ↺ ↺ Ar
4,4 4,4 4,4 \ \ \ 3,2 3,3 3,3 ↺ ↺ ↺ Co
4,4 4,4 4,4 4,4 4,4 4,4 3,4 3,4 3,4 3,4 3,4 3,4 Pc
4,4 4,4 4,4 4,4 4,4 4,4 3,4 3,4 3,4 3,4 3,4 3,4 Ha
4,4 4,4 4,4 4,4 4,4 4,4 2,4 2,4 2,4 2,4 2,4 2,4 Nc
Nc Na Pc Co Ar Sh Pd Dl Cm Hr Ba Ch
Bias Games
Nash equilibria with unequal payoffs shaded
Zero-sum games     Pareto-inferior equilibria
2x2atlas.org © CC-BY-SA
Dominant strategy leads to inequality at a single equilibrium
Grievance: "some actors obtain their most preferred outcome while others 
are left aggrieved" Stein 1982:304
Rambo: "the movie character who gets his way without ever cooperating" 
Hasenclever et al. 1997:53 fn 24 "the aggrieved actor may well endeavor to 
transform the situation" Zürn 1992:69 
Suasion: "suasion problems have equilibrium outcomes that leave one actor 
dissatisfied" Martin 1992:77
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8. Ordinal payoffs for entries in the Atlas of Interpersonal Situations 
 
Figure A10 shows the original payoff values used by Kelley et al. (2003) to illustrate entries 
in the Atlas of Interpersonal Situations and equivalent ordinal payoffs ranked from 1 to 4. The 
ordinal payoffs have been standardized to put Row’s highest payoff in the right-hand column 
and Column’s highest payoff in the upper row (Row’s 4 right, Column’s 4 up). As discussed 
in the main text, this standardization of ordinal payoffs and orientation of best outcomes 
shows the convergence between interdependence theory and the extended topology of 2x2 
games in identifying archetypal games.  
 
Figure A10. Illustrative payoff matrices for entries in the Atlas of Interpersonal Situations 
and ordinal equivalents in standardized orientation (Row’s 4 right, Column’s 4 up).  
 
    
  
Entry # Page Original Standardized
Primal Independence (DhDh)
1 Independence: We go our separate ways
141 E1.1 10 8 10 0 4 4 4 1
0 8 0 0 1 4 1 1
141 E1.2 0 8 0 -6 4 4 4 1
-10 8 -10 -6 1 4 1 1
Primal Exchange (DuDu)
2 Mutual partner control: I scratch your back, you scratch mine
149 E2.1 8 10 0 10 1 4 4 4
8 0 0 0 1 1 4 1
149 E2.2 -10 0 0 0 1 4 4 4
-10 -2 0 -2 1 1 4 1
Primal Coordination (DoDo)
3 Corresponding mutual joint control: Getting in sync
160 E3.1 5 10 0 0 4 4 1 1
0 0 5 10 1 1 4 4
160 E3.2 -10 -10 0 0 1 1 4 4
0 0 -10 -10 4 4 1 1
Primal Conflict (DoDo1)
4 Conflicting mutual joint control: Match or mismatch
171 E4.1 5 -5 -5 5 4 1 1 4 Primal Conflict, Matching Pennies
-5 5 5 -5 1 4 4 1
172 E4.2 -10 -10 -10 0 1 4 1 1 Basic Discord, L1
0 -10 -10 -10 1 1 4 1
Prisoner's Dilemma (PdPd)
5 Prisoner's dilemma: Me versus we
189 5 5 -5 10 1 4 3 3
10 -5 0 0 2 2 4 1
Threat/Jekyll-Hyde (MhMk)
6 Threat: Trading loyalty for justice
202 E6.1 12 6 6 12 3 4 4 3
6 0 0 6 1 3 3 1
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Chicken (CkCk)
7 Chicken: Death before dishonor
211 E7.1 -3 -3 -9 3 2 4 3 3
3 -9 -15 -15 1 1 4 2
212 E7.2 15 15 9 21 2 4 3 3
21 9 3 3 1 1 4 2
Hero (HrHr)
8 Hero: Let's do it you way
226 E8.1 8 12 0 0 3 4 1 1
4 4 12 8 2 2 4 3
E8.2 4 4 12 8 3 4 1 1
8 12 0 0 2 2 4 3
Stag Hunt (ShSh)
9 Conjunctive problems: Together we can do it
237 E9.1 7 7 0 0 1 1 4 4 Win-Win
0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1
E9.2 7 7 0 3 1 3 4 4 Stag Hunt
3 0 3 3 3 3 3 1
Volunteer's Dilemma (MbMb)
10 Disjunctive problems: Either of us can do it
247 E10.1 10 10 10 10 4 4 4 4 Avoidance
10 10 0 0 4 4 1 1
E10.2 7 7 7 10 3 4 3 3
10 7 0 0 1 1 4 3
Primal Win-Lose (DuDh1)
11.1 Asymetric dependence: You're the boss
266 E11.1 10 -4 -4 10 1 4 4 1
10 -4 -4 10 1 4 4 1
Primal Help (DhDo) Helping Hand
11.2 267 E11.2 4 -4 -4 10 1 1 4 4
-4 -4 4 10 4 1 1 4
48 2.8.II.2 0 10 5 0 1 1 4 4
5 10 0 0 4 1 1 4
Primal Gift (DhDu)
48 2.8.I.1 10 5 0 0 1 1 4 4
10 5 0 0 1 1 4 4
Primal Favors (DoDu)
48 2.8.II.2 0 10 5 0 1 1 4 4
5 10 0 0 4 1 1 4
Convention (LoLo) issues discussed using payoff for Middle Harmony (MhMh), Invisible Hand
85 4.2.2 12 12 6 6 3 3 4 4
6 6 0 0 1 1 3 3
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9. Indifference and changing preferences 
 
Making and breaking ties represents changes in preferences. It can sometimes be convenient 
to assume fixed preferences, as in much of game theory and economic theorizing. However, 
there are many reasons why payoff values might change. Individual preferences and choice 
behavior may be stochastic and dynamic, influenced by multiple external and internal 
processes (Symmonds and Dolan 2012). New information, better understanding, or careful 
consideration might show why one outcome is superior. Prominent examples or social norms 
might focus attention on desirable outcomes. Persuasion could cause more concern about 
what happens to another person (other-regarding preferences), such as putting a higher value 
on mutually beneficial win-win outcomes. Similar changes in preferences about others’ 
outcomes might come from bonding within a group or focusing on what is best for the group 
(team reasoning). Interaction could also result in antipathy or rivalry, competitive feelings, 
and a willingness to punish or suffer losses if it makes the other worse off.  
 
Conversely, changes might erase differences, equalizing outcome ranks, creating indifference 
between outcomes. Some outcomes may come to appear irrelevant and not worth attention. 
More information, instability, or uncertainty might make some comparisons seem 
meaningless. Decisions might focus on a few outcomes, ignoring others or acting indifferent, 
as if they were equally ranked, due to simple heuristics, urgency, or exhaustion. People might 
cease caring or paying attention to what happens to the other person. Thus, changes could blur 
or dissolve the difference between some outcomes, simplifying payoff structures, or they 
could sharpen differences, resolving into a more complex configuration of payoffs.  
 
Payoff swaps and simplification and differentiation of payoff structures can also be seen in 
terms of payoffs that vary (trembling payoffs). These might vary , perhaps in a predictable 
way, such as seasonal changes in water availability or risks that can be estimated with 
reasonable accuracy. Or payoffs could be uncertain, in the sense of incomplete information 
that limits the ability to form accurate expectations, such as the dynamics of poorly-
understood aquifers. More fundamentally, preferences may be incomplete in more profound 
ways, perhaps only resolved to the extent necessary to make specific decisions, using 
heuristics as part of bounded rationality (Simon 1990). Values may be diverse and not easily 
reconcilable, within a community or even within a single decisionmaker (Berlin 2012). 
 
To the extent outcomes can be valued more precisely, the topology of payoff swaps can be 
extended to more fully map the payoff space of 2x2 games. For simplicity in exposition, in 
this paper we mostly present ideas using ordinal games with ranked outcomes. Where payoffs 
can be measured more precisely, on interval (ratio) or cardinal (real) scales, those values can 
also be normalized to a 1-4 scale and mapped onto a continuous version of the topology of 
2x2 games. A continuous payoff space models more detailed differences in the ranking of 
outcomes and more gradual transitions in ranking that transform one game into another. 
Symmetric ordinal games provide coordinates for naming and locating games within a payoff 
space of 2x2 games, like integers on a number line or Cartesian coordinates. Within this 
space, archetypes offer useful landmarks for understanding the structure and diversity of 
interdependence, including opportunities and challenges for cooperation. 
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10. Dimensions of interdependence 
 
Analysis of archetypal games shows areas of potential for further research and synthesis 
concerning the relationships between different kinds of social situations. As described above, 
analysis of archetypal games based on the topology of 2x2 games converges with 
interdependence theory in social psychology (Kelley and Thibaut 1978, Kelley et al. 2003, 
Balliet et al. 2017) in identifying a central role for the three symmetric situations 
exemplifying elementary independence, coordination, and exchange. Interdependence theory 
uses an analysis of variance approach to decompose payoff matrices into row, diagonal, and 
column components. These three components are exemplified by the “single component” 
games for independence (control over the actor’s own outcome), coordination (joint control), 
and exchange (control over the partner’s outcome). Any payoff matrix can be composed and 
analyzed as the weighted combination of the single component games. Interdependence 
theory arranges games in three dimensions related to independence, congruence (coordination 
or conflict), and dependence. Analysis using the topology of 2x2 games offers an alternative 
and potentially more easily understood way to map the relationships between different 
elementary social situations, including archetypes and regions modelling different problems 
of collective action.  
 
The normalized payoffs in the continuous topology of 2x2 games form a subspace of the 
eight-dimensional space of 2x2 games analyzed by Saari and colleagues (Jessie and Saari 
2019, Guisasola and Saari 2020).  With an interest in explaining equilibrium selection in 
coordination games, Guisasola and Saari (2020) make a decomposition of payoff matrices 
(with a full range of payoff values, not just ordinal or normalized values) into three 
orthogonal components somewhat similar to those of interdependence theory: 1) a Nash 
equilibrium (best response) component under each actor’s own control, 2) a joint 
coordination/anti-coordination component, and 3) an externality component for how each 
actor’s actions increase or decrease the other’s payoffs. They also have a “kernel” scaling 
factor for each actor’s payoff values. For diagnostic analysis and design, their coordinate 
system helps examine how the mutual gains from coordination and the impact of externalities 
may outweigh incentives towards a Nash equilibrium. This seems to offer a general 
framework to examine the question of how changes in payoff values increase or reduce 
“pressures” that affect behavior in 2x2 games (Rapoport et al. 1976, Kelley et al. 2003).   
 
Interdependence Theory and Guisasola and Saari’s game coordinate system decomposition 
both map the payoff space of 2x2 games in three dimensions with components for 
independent control over one’s own fate, as in Primal Independence; joint control as in Primal 
Coordination; and control over each other’s outcome, as in Primal Exchange. The topology of 
2x2 games maps regions of related games according to the number of Nash equilibria 
(resulting from dominant strategies), displays coordination and cyclic (anti-
coordination/conflict) games as compact connected regions, and also groups games according 
to their externalities (inducement correspondences) (Robinson and Goforth 2005, Bruns 
2015). This seems to offer a fruitful opportunity for further comparison and analysis. 
Interdependence theory and the coordinate systems developed by Saari and colleagues assume 
orthogonal dimensions completely distinct from each other (uncorrelated). As an alternative, 
the topology of 2x2 games suggests partially overlapping regions and a more complex 
distribution of characteristics. The structure of interdependence in the payoff space of 2x2 
games might also be further analyzed using additional approaches, such as correlated 
dimensions as in factor analysis, crisp or fuzzy categories of cases as in QCA (Ragin 2009), 
or regions with emergent and distinctive properties as in non-linear dynamics (Strogatz 2018).  
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Another approach to applying archetypes is to concentrate on a smaller set of games. 
Rapoport (1967) originally identified four symmetric archetypes for conflict, based on 
Prisoner’s Dilemma (Exploiter), Chicken (Martyr), Leader, and Hero. Alternatively, in 
research on psychological processes prevalent in conflict and negotiation, Halevy and 
colleagues (Halevy et al. 2012, Halevy and Katz 2013) found that study participants usually 
described situations that fit four symmetric archetypal games: Prisoner’s Dilemma, Chicken, 
Stag Hunt, and Maximum Difference (Concord). Molho and Balliet (2017) suggest that 
experiments and meta-analysis could compare interdependence theory with analysis based on 
a small set of prototypical games. Such comparative analysis could extend to include the 
topology of 2x2 games and the game coordinate systems proposed by Saari and colleagues  
(Jessie and Saari 2019, Guisasola and Saari 2020) as further alternative or complementary 
approaches for modeling and analyzing behavior in social situations.   
 
11. Limitations and extensions: understanding complexity in payoff space 
 
If “my mask protects you and your mask protects me” and I care about what happens to you, 
this transforms the situation so that I prefer to wear a mask, whatever you do. This changes 
the game from Primal Exchange into Concord, as in Figure 3. Indifference changes into 
higher ranks for outcomes where I wear a mask. A similar change could also occur if it turns 
out that wearing a mask also gives me some protection, if norms shift so I am concerned 
about my neighbors’ approval, or if not wearing a mask risks penalties for violating a 
government rule. Additional considerations could include inconvenience of mask-wearing, 
different beliefs about risks and benefits, and politicization of mask wearing as some kind of 
signal or expression of identity. All these changes could occur asymmetrically, for one but not 
the other, creating a variety of possible payoff structures. Simple models such as the 
archetypes discussed in this paper may sometimes offer useful insights, but are only tools for 
trying to understand and act in a complex world. Pejó and Biczók (2020) offer an example 
and discussion of early efforts to apply game theory models to the challenges posed by Covid-
19.   
 
Archetypal games offer highly simplified models that illustrate and help analyze some 
important aspects of social situations. However, problems and solutions often depend on 
specific details of history and context. The transformations by making and breaking ties in 
primal archetypes described in this paper are a useful starting point, but trace only a few of 
the vast number of possible pathways through the topology of payoff swaps that connect 2x2 
games (Robinson et al. 2007). Empirical changes are not limited to those that would make or 
break ties in a single pair of payoffs, or only follow a pathway of symmetric changes in 
payoffs.  
 
For payoffs not restricted to ordinal ranks, normalized payoffs can be mapped onto a 
continuous version of the topology (Bruns 2015). However, the actual payoff values may still 
contain crucial information, such as when benefits or risks are very high for one outcome or 
one actor. As discussed above, individual preferences and choice behavior may be stochastic 
and dynamic, influenced by multiple external and internal processes. Information may be 
incomplete in a variety of ways. The topology of games can extend beyond 2x2 games to 
include situations with multiple actors and help understand the potential for endogenous 
evolution of situations to achieve better results (Frey and Atkisson 2020). Archetypal games 
could help expand the menu of models considered in research, including efforts to understand 
how cooperation is affected by different rules and other conditions (Taylor and Ward 1982, 
Nowak 2006, Taylor 2006, Van Lange et al. 2014, Balliet et al. 2017), such as common 
knowledge (Schelling 1960, Chwe 2013), repeated interaction (Axelrod 1984), 
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communication (Ostrom et al. 1994), and negotiation, including with intelligent agents 
(Crandall et al. 2018).  
 
The ways in which simple archetypes generate more diverse situations offer tools for 
understanding similarity and diversity in interdependence in social-ecological situations. 
Archetypes and their relationships may thereby contribute to the potential role of game theory 
as a part of a unifying language for behavioral and evolutionary science (Gintis 2007, Cronk 
and Leech 2013). Archetypes provide simple building blocks for understanding social-
ecological systems that may also contribute to the quest to understand more complex systems, 
as stated by Elinor Ostrom (2010): 
 
We should continue to use simple models where they capture enough of 
the core underlying structure and incentives that they usefully predict 
outcomes. When the world we are trying to explain and improve, however, 
is not well described by a simple model, we must continue to improve our 
frameworks and theories so as to be able to understand complexity and not 
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